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INTRODUCTION

T

HE U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to extend copyright
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protection to “Authors” for their “Writings.”1 And the current Copyright
Act manifests this power by granting copyrights to “original works of
authorship.”2 Yet despite the obvious centrality of the concepts of authorship and writings to copyright law, courts and scholars are only beginning to pay them significant attention.3 Compared with other parts of
the Constitution, including the term “speech” in the First Amendment or
the term “commerce” elsewhere in Article I, the central terms of the
copyright power have received little constitutional interpretation.4 Copyright jurisprudence did not begin with a theory of authorship, and it has
not worked one out.5
1
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
2
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). As explained below, Congress did
not intend to exhaust its constitutional power with the statutory grant of rights in the 1976
Act. See infra text accompanying notes 37–41.
3
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DePaul
L. Rev. 1063, 1066 (2003) (“Few judicial decisions address what authorship means, or who
is an author.”); David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2001) (“U.S. copyright law adopts a concept of authorship that is
remarkably broad, albeit not completely unbounded. Its roots lie not in theory, but in an uncritical inquiry into whether the work in question owes its origin to the putative author.”).
Peter Jaszi, one of the few scholars to discuss copyright theory, notes: “Legal scholars concerned with copyright occupy themselves not by analyzing copyright theory, but instead by
debating the rights and wrongs of technical doctrinal issues presented by judicial opinions.”
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991
Duke L.J. 455, 458. This is certainly less true today than it was in 1991, but the assertion is
still largely the case. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 501 (2012) [hereinafter Buccafusco, Making Sense] (discussing
intellectual property (“IP”) law’s differential treatment of the human senses).
4
As Dotan Oliar notes, however, “[i]ntellectual property is rapidly becoming constitutionalized.” Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Geo. L.J. 1771, 1773
(2006). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of
Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (2002) (discussing issues of constitutional interpretation of the Copyright Clause before the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003)).
5
To paraphrase, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 72 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2009) (1881) (“The law did not begin with a theory. It has never worked one out.”).
There have been some notable efforts to understand the nature of authorship in copyright
law. See Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong With Copying? 111–13 (2015); Nimmer,
supra note 3, at 6; Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 Am. U.
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The lack of a coherent theory about the relationship between authors
and writings in copyright law has created a number of difficulties over
time. For example, without a theory of authorship, we cannot judge the
boundaries of congressional power to extend copyright protection to
new media. Does the constitutional grant empower Congress to provide
copyright protection for a series of yoga poses or for a garden?6 In addition, without a theory of authorship, we cannot determine which aspects
of a work are potentially copyrightable. When a programmer writes
computer code, for example, what aspects of her behavior count as copyrightable authorship?7
In order to answer these questions, we need to understand the relationship between authors and writings. What is the relationship between
some person and some work such that we can say that the person is an
author and the work is her writing? What are the kinds of behaviors that
constitute authorship and in what sorts of texts can they be embodied?
This Article provides a theory of authorship that answers these questions. The nature of the inquiry is similar to First Amendment discussions about what behaviors constitute “speech.”8
The Supreme Court has offered some guidance. In order to be copyrightable, a work must be original, at least minimally creative, and fixed

L. Rev. 1323, 1326 (1996) (discussing, primarily, the nature of the contributions that qualify
a person for “joint authorship” status).
6
Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 756558, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011); see
also Christopher Buccafusco, Authorship and the Boundaries of Copyright: Ideas, Expressions, and Functions in Yoga, Choreography, and Other Works, 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 421
(2016) (discussing the Choudhury case).
7
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Many other copyright law issues involve questions of authorship, perhaps most obviously those involving
joint authorship and works made for hire. For example, the theory offered here helps resolve
the recent litigation in Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). Because of the
scope of those issues, I am reserving them for a subsequent article.
8
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1769 (2004) (distinguishing First
Amendment “coverage” and “protection”); Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54,
55–56 (1989) (arguing that freedom of speech is freedom to engage in communicative action, not strategic action). On the relationship between copyright law and the First Amendment, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment
Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture at
the UCLA School of Law (Nov. 15, 2012), in 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1082, 1084 (2013).
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in a tangible medium of expression.9 Original, in this sense, means that
the work was not copied from another source.10 It is a binary distinction.
Creativity is a scalar concept involving more or less novelty or cleverness.11 The Court has explained, however, that the threshold for creativity in copyright law is very low.12 And to constitute a fixed writing, a
work must be made “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.”13
But these three requirements—originality, creativity, and fixation—
are insufficient for determining whether a work is the writing of an author. A new brake pad for an automobile may be original (that is, not
copied), at least minimally creative, and fixed in a tangible medium, but
most people would not consider a brake pad to be a writing of an author.
An additional element is necessary.
This Article argues that, to be an author of a writing, one must intend
to produce some mental effect in an audience. Accordingly, a writing is
any text, object, or medium that is capable of producing that mental effect. Copyright will subsist not in the mental effect produced but in the
manner or form by which it is produced if that manner is original, minimally creative, and fixed in a tangible medium of expression. The Constitution grants Congress the power to extend copyright protection to
those aspects of a person’s behavior that are intended to produce mental
effects and that are original, minimally creative, and fixed. Behaviors,
creations, utterances, depictions, expressions, or other representations
made by a person that do not meet these criteria cannot constitutionally
be granted copyrights.
9
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author
(as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity.”).
10
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (“‘Original’ in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to the
‘author.’”).
11
Nimmer, supra note 3, at 14–15 (“‘[O]riginality’ means that the work derives from the
copyright owner, as opposed to that individual having copied it from a previous source,
while ‘creativity’ refers to a spark above the level of the banal.”).
12
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as
they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”
(citation omitted)).
13
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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This theory of authorship provides both an outer bound of congressional authority and a mechanism for delimiting the scope of copyright
in protected works. It tells us whether Congress can extend copyright
protection to certain classes of creativity and, if Congress has done so,
which aspects of those works can receive protection. No component of a
work that does not entail authorship can be copyrighted. Not all such aspects of a work will ultimately receive protection,14 but the authorship
inquiry enables us to determine which parts of a work may be protected.
The details for this theory will be worked out below in Part II. For
now, consider how it helps answer the questions posed above. Garden
designers often intend that the appearance of their work produce a mental effect on those who experience it.15 In addition, gardens may produce
mental effects through the other sensations that they create, whether
touch, taste, sound, or smell.16 Accordingly, gardens can count as writings of authors capable of sustaining copyrights.17 With respect to the
computer programmer, Congress has extended protection to software,
and this seems acceptable according to my theory. The code that a programmer writes may entail authorship in two ways.18 First, the code may
instruct a computer to produce audio or visual outputs that are meant to
create mental effects. In this case, the outputs, if they meet the other requirements, would be copyrightable. Second, the code itself may be
written in such a way as to produce mental effects on other readers of
the code. These effects must be distinguished from the aspects of the
code that are intended to instruct the computer in its operations and that
are chosen for purposes of efficiency and functionality rather than to
produce mental effects. Here, the authorship requirement limits copyright protection to certain aspects of the work in question.
Questions about authorship will arise with increasing frequency in
coming years, as new media and artificial intelligence provide novel av14
This is due to limitations on the scope of copyright based on functionality concerns. See
id. (limiting copyright to certain “useful article[s]”).
15
See Tom Turner, Garden History: Philosophy and Design, 2000 BC – 2000 AD, at 6–20
(2005) (discussing garden design theory).
16
Id. at 74 (“[T]here is a most beautiful grove of Apollo, with cultivated trees, and all
those of which, although they bear no fruit, are pleasing to smell or look upon.” (quoting
Pausanius (c. 160 AD))).
17
As will be discussed further below, gardens may still not merit copyright protection if
they are insufficiently fixed or fall outside of the statutory grant of rights established by
Congress.
18
I discuss the treatment of computer code extensively in Subsection III.B.3.
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enues for creative production.19 Authorship questions are also at the
heart of recent federal appellate court opinions involving the ownership
of works, such as Garcia v. Google, Inc.20 and 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
Merkin.21 The theory proposed here can help answer these questions,
although resolution of the latter cases will have to wait until a future article.22
Part I of this Article explains the constitutional and statutory bases for
copyright protection, and it shows why the accounts of courts and scholars about copyrightable authorship have been insufficient for generating
a coherent theory of authorship. In Part II, this Article introduces and defends a new theory of copyrightable authorship based on categorial intentions to produce mental effects. It shows how this account of the writings of authors relates to other aspects of copyrightable authorship,
including originality and creativity. Part III applies this theory of authorship to two central problems in copyright law: the scope of the constitutional grant of power and the aspects of works that count as copyrightable authorship.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW AND WRITINGS OF AUTHORS
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“Congress shall have the power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”23 This

19

See generally Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 5 (examining the effects of “artificially intelligent
authorship” on copyright law); Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law,
64 Emory L.J. 71 (2014) (discussing how copyright may encourage the creation of expressive works by examining issues through the lens of information theory); James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 657 (2016) (discussing the impact of
reading by computers on conceptions of copyright law); Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as
Grist for the Data Mill, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1503 (2012) (discussing the implications of
library digitization on copyright law). See also Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of
Cyberlaw, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 513, 513, 523 (2015) (mentioning the role of robotics in intellectual property).
20
786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that an actress was not likely to succeed on
her claim that her performance in a film was a copyrightable “work”).
21
791 F.3d 247, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a director’s contributions to a film
did not constitute a work of authorship amenable to copyright protection).
22
Given length limitations, I also bracket discussion of the role of authorship in “useful
articles” copyright cases.
23
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Clause accomplishes a number of goals. First, it establishes congressional power to grant copyrights and patents.24 Next, when interpreted
according to its parallel construction, it establishes separate realms for
these two rights.25 Copyright law addresses the efforts of “Authors” to
promote “Science”26 through their “Writings,” while patent law addresses “Discoveries” made by “Inventors” to improve the “useful Arts.”27
Finally, the Clause creates limits on Congress’s power.28 For example,
the “limited times” language of the Clause prevents Congress from
adopting copyrights or patents of infinite length.29
In the two centuries since its ratification, Congress, courts, and scholars have grappled with the correct interpretation of this text.30 They have
attempted to work out the relationship between authors and writings in
order to understand both the powers granted and their limits.31 This Part
charts the history of these efforts and explains their theoretical and practical shortcomings.

24
Solum, supra note 4, at 20 (“The Intellectual Property Clause, like every clause in the
eighth Section of the first Article, grants a power with an infinitive phrase and a corresponding direct or indirect object.”).
25
Id. at 11–12; see also L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 365, 367 (2000) (“The parallel construction makes it easy to identify
the copyright clause: ‘The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive right to
their . . . Writings.’”).
26
“Science” is to be understood with its eighteenth-century meaning of “knowledge.” Solum, supra note 4, at 51.
27
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951) (“But the
very language of the Constitution differentiates (a) ‘authors’ and their ‘writings’ from (b)
‘inventors’ and their ‘discoveries.’”).
28
Solum, supra note 4, at 13 (“[T]he Copyright Clause grants the power to pursue a goal
and limits that power by specifying the means that may be employed.”).
29
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208–09 (2003) (upholding a twenty-year extension of
a copyright term because it did not violate the “limited Times” language of the Constitution).
30
For an excellent recent treatment and catalog of previous efforts, see Sean M. O’Connor,
The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev.
733 (2015).
31
See Staff Members of the N.Y.U. Law Review Under the Guidance of Prof. Walter J.
Derenberg, The Meaning of “Writings” in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution (Study
No. 3), in Staff of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Copyright Law Revision: Studies
Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, Studies 1–4, at 61, 74–83 (Comm. Print 1961).
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A. From the Framers to Feist—Authorship as Expressing Ideas
The first U.S. Congress passed the country’s initial copyright law in
1790, extending copyright protection to the authors of a “map, chart, [or]
book” for a fourteen-year period, renewable for another fourteen years.32
The Act provided no sense of who could qualify as an author of any of
these texts, and it gave little guidance as to the nature of the rights that
were protected.33 Nothing was said about the originality or creativity. In
fact, two of the three classes of protectable works strike the modern
reader as media in which originality and creativity would be harmful rather than beneficial.34 Copyright law at the time was more focused on
knowledge than on creativity and art.35 Congress may have been more
interested in encouraging people to explore the continent than to write
novels, which could easily and freely be copied from English authors.36
The narrow scope of the first Copyright Act introduces an important
feature of copyright jurisprudence. Historically, Congress has not employed its full constitutional power when granting copyright protection.37 The Constitution allows Congress to extend copyrights to any authors for their writings if doing so promotes the progress of science.38
Congress, it seems, has not thought that all authors need copyright protection for their writings. Individual categories of works have been ex-

32

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (entitled “An Act for the encouragement of learning”) (repealed 1831).
33
Authors were given the exclusive rights to “print, reprint, publish or vend” copies of
their works. Id.
34
Diane Zimmerman writes:
Maps and charts do not (indeed should not) necessarily reflect much originality or
unique authorial input, but accurate ones were of enormous social value to a young
country with vast, comparatively unexplored territories surrounding it, and protecting
them may well have seemed quite consistent with the public-interest goals of intellectual property.
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It’s an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive Essence, 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187, 199 (2005).
35
Solum, supra note 4, at 53 (noting that Congress seemed particularly attentive to promoting systematic knowledge and learning as compared to creativity). See generally Oren
Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186 (2008) (examining discourse on copyright in the
nineteenth century and the development of the concept of authorship).
36
Robert Spoo, Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain 21–22
(2013).
37
R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1489, 1521 (2014).
38
Solum, supra note 4, at 20.

COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2016]

A Theory of Copyright Authorship

1237

tended copyright protection over time, and even the 1909 Copyright Act,
which extended protection to “all the writings of an author,” was typically construed as not employing full constitutional authority.39 Accordingly, the realm of copyright law can be depicted in the following Venn diagram:
Figure 1: Constitutional Powers versus Statutory Action

Constitutional .. writings" of " authors"

Constitutional authority extends to all authors for all of their writings.
But at any given time, Congress has only provided statutory protection
for a limited class of works.40 When discussing copyrightable subject
matter, we must always keep in mind the distinction between constitutional subject matter and statutory subject matter. This Article proposes
a theory for understanding the limits of the larger circle, the outer bound

39

Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976). Reese explains:
Nevertheless, courts and the Copyright Office interpreted the 1909 Act as not extending protection to all of the “Writings” of “Authors” within Congress’s constitutional
power to protect. In particular, courts declined to read the statute’s broad declaration
of subject matter as granting copyright protection to sound recordings, which were not
a class specifically enumerated in the statute but which courts did view as “Writings”
of “Authors” within Congress’s constitutional power. Courts and the Copyright Office
essentially viewed the scope of statutory subject matter under the 1909 Act as coextensive with the list of enumerated administrative classes.
Reese, supra note 37, at 1518 (footnotes omitted).
40
Reese, supra note 37, at 1519.
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of constitutional authority.41 It also explains the scope of the copyrights
granted to those works falling within the smaller circle.
Shortly after the 1790 Act, Congress began using more and more of
its constitutional authority. Copyrightable subject matter expanded by
statute first to engraving, etchings, and prints in 1802,42 then to musical
compositions in 1831,43 and to dramatic compositions in 1856.44 Copyright became available for photographs in 186545 and for paintings,
drawings, and statuary in 1870.46 Although the Congresses enacting
these laws seem to have thought little about their constitutional grounding, they created opportunities for litigants and judges to begin to develop a copyright jurisprudence.47
In 1876, Congress attempted to enact federal trademark legislation on
the basis of its Copyright Clause power in Article I.48 When five defendants challenged their indictments under the law as unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court agreed.49 In the Trade-Mark Cases, Justice Miller explained:
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been,
to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such
as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind.
The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.50

A trademark, he noted, does not have to meet these standards: “It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.”51 It is
not, then, a writing of an author in the constitutional sense.
Justice Miller’s opinion provided the first steps toward a theory of authors and writings. It, at least implicitly, declared that congressional ex41

The issue parallels the distinction that Frederick Schauer has made between “covered”
and “protected” speech. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 1769.
42
Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171.
43
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436.
44
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138, 139.
45
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540.
46
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
47
See Bridy, supra note 19, at 5–6.
48
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
49
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 82–83, 99 (1879).
50
Id. at 94.
51
Id.; see also Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 297–98 (7th Cir.
1902) (“[A]uthorship implies that there has been put into the production something meritorious from the author’s own mind; that the product embodies the thought of the author . . . .”).
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pansion of copyrightable subject matter beyond literal “writing” was
constitutional. And it established two requirements for copyrightable authorship: originality and intellectual labor. The opinion, however, as
would become characteristic of those about copyright authorship, gave
little guidance on either of these terms.52 During this period, if the author’s work was a book or other copyrightable subject matter, and it was
original, it was generally considered copyrightable.53
Having distinguished copyright law from trademark law in the TradeMark Cases, the Court was called on to distinguish copyright law from
patent law a few years later in Baker v. Selden.54 The plaintiff owned the
copyright to a book describing a new system of bookkeeping, and the
defendant produced a similar book describing the same system.55 The
Court was asked to determine the extent to which the copyright in the
book gave its author exclusive rights to the use of the system described
therein.56 The answer was none. The grant of copyright to the author of
the work extended only to the book “considered as a book, as the work
of an author, conveying information on the subject.”57 But the Court distinguished the copyright in “the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate.”58 If the author wanted an exclusive right to use this
new “art” or “method[] of operation,”59 he would have to apply for a patent and prove its novelty.60
Copyright law, then, protected the language with which the author
conveyed his ideas. It also protected “ornamental designs, or pictorial
illustrations addressed to the taste.”61 For these visual media, the Court
said, “their form is their essence, and their object, the production of

52

This reading is derived from the opinion’s argument that novelty, imagination, and genius are lacking from trademarks while they do exist for copyrighted works.
53
Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between
Authorship and Invention, in Intellectual Property Stories 159, 176 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
54
101 U.S. 99, 99 (1879).
55
Id. at 100.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 102.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 103.
60
See id. at 102. The Court explained, “To give to the author of the book an exclusive
property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letterspatent, not of copyright.” Id.
61
Id. at 103.
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pleasure in their contemplation.”62 By contrast, patent law protected “the
teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art [which]
have their final end in application and use.”63 The copyright-patent divide, in the eyes of the Baker Court, amounted to description and pleasure versus application and use.64
The Court’s approach in Baker has guided copyright jurisprudence
since.65 According to the Court, authors express or convey information—ideas.66 The ideas include principles, practices, and methods,
and the expression of those ideas involves the author’s decisions about
the language or images he chooses to convey them. Copyright extends to
the author’s expression of the ideas, but not to the ideas themselves.67
This has become known as the idea/expression dichotomy.68 It is a central principle of copyright jurisprudence, although, as we will see, it has
proved incredibly hard to apply.
In 1884, the Court was again asked to construe the terms “Authors”
and “Writings,” this time with respect to photography. The defendant in
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony argued that Congress exceeded its constitutional power in granting copyrights to photographs because they are not writings of an author.69 Because a photograph simply
represents the exact features of the world before the lens, in this case the
likeness of Oscar Wilde, the defendant argued, it lacked the originality
and intellectual effort required by copyright law.70 The Court disagreed.
An author, the Court declared, is “he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”71
The Court also provided a broad definition of the term “Writings”: “all
62

Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
64
Samuelson, supra note 53, at 177–78.
65
Id. at 180–81.
66
See Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 (“The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains.”).
67
See id. at 100–01 (“Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common property of the whole world, any author has the right to express the one, or explain and
use the other, in his own way.”).
68
Samuelson notes that Baker did not use the word “expression” in the opinion. Samuelson, supra note 53, at 177 n.111.
69
111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884) (“It is insisted in argument, that a photograph being a reproduction on paper of the exact features of some natural object or of some person, is not a writing
of which the producer is the author.”); Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of
Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 385, 386 (2004).
70
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56.
71
Id. at 58 (quoting Worcester’s Academic Dictionary) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63
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forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in
the mind of the author are given visible expression.”72 Here, Napoleon
Sarony had produced a “mental conception” of a scene, and, by posing
his subject, selecting and arranging his costume, and disposing the light
and shade, he gave that conception “visible form.”73 Through all of these
efforts and choices, Sarony became an author.74
The Court noted in dicta, however, that not all photographs would
qualify as copyrightable. Some “ordinary” photographs, produced by
simply “manual operation,” aspiring only towards “accuracy
of . . . representation” might fall short.75 We are not told why, though.
Do such photographs lack originality? Are they insufficiently creative?
Does the nature of the creator’s intentions—accuracy versus art—affect
their copyrightability? Whatever the case, the Court seemed to believe
that creators had to clear some bar on their way to copyright protection.
In the twentieth century, that bar would be lowered nearly to the
ground.76 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., Justice Holmes
upheld the copyrightability of an advertising poster.77 Rather than
searching for genius in the work—something he strongly cautioned
judges against—Holmes discovered the requisite authorship in the “inherent uniqueness of human personality.”78 He wrote, “[t]he copy is the
personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. . . . something irreducible, which is one man’s
alone. That something he may copyright.”79 As long as he does not copy
from another, a creator has done enough to merit copyrightable authorship merely by placing his pen upon the paper.80 That others are willing

72

Id.
Id. at 55.
74
Rebecca Tushnet explains: “In order to find that photographs are copyrightable, courts
had to identify photographers as authors, adding expression rather than just copying facts
from the world. They did this by emphasizing particular choices made by photographers, especially timing, angles, and similar decisions.” Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words:
The Images of Copyright, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 683, 714 (2012).
75
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59.
76
Bracha, supra note 35, at 208–09 (“Copyright doctrine came to place originality at the
heart of the field, awarding it a privileged status, while, at the same time, reducing the reach
of originality doctrine to negligible dimensions.”).
77
188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
78
Bridy, supra note 19, at 6.
79
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
80
Jaszi, supra note 3, at 483 (“The Bleistein opinion, with its emphasis on the ‘work’ and
its abdication of a judicial role as aesthetic arbiter, both effaces and generalizes ‘authorship,’
73
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to copy his work is testimony to its economic, if not aesthetic, value.81 A
similar result obtained in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,
where Judge Frank upheld the copyright of a mezzotint of a public domain work as long as it contained something more than a trivial variation on the original.82 Frank also suggested that the creator need not
even intend for the variation to arise, as long as, having “hit upon” it, he
adopted it as his own.83
As the bar to copyrightable authorship slipped lower, the scope of
copyrightable subject matter broadened. Copyright protection was easily
extended to motion pictures in 1912, since they were just the moving
versions of photographs.84 In 1971, Congress granted copyright protection to sound recordings with little discussion of how recording existing
sounds amounts to authorship.85 Perhaps more importantly, the twentieth
century saw the growth of copyright protection for so-called “useful articles:” objects that have both a utilitarian function and aesthetic design
features such as belt buckles, ashtrays, and coffeepots.86
In 1954, the Supreme Court affirmed the copyrightability of a statuette of a Balinese dancer that had been modified to serve as a lamp
base.87 Importantly, however, the Court in Mazer v. Stein declined to

leaving this category with little or no meaningful content and none of its traditional associations.”).
81
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252.
82
191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution
and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’” (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d
512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945))).
83
Judge Frank writes:
There is evidence that [the mezzotints] were not intended to, and did not, imitate the
paintings they reproduced. But even if their substantial departures from the paintings
were inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the “author”
may adopt it as his and copyright it
Id. at 104–05 (footnote omitted). It may be tempting to read this paragraph to suggest that
the author’s intent is entirely irrelevant to the copyrightability of the work. The last phrase,
however, suggests that Frank believes the author must “adopt” the variation as his own. So it
appears as if the author must at least engage in the act of adopting the variation for it to
count as part of his copyright.
84
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5, 37 Stat. 488, 488.
85
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 391; H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 5
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570.
86
Samuelson, supra note 53, at 181–82.
87
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213–14 (1954).
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address the issue of whether the lamp base fell within the scope of Congress’s constitutional power to grant copyrights because it had not been
raised by the parties.88 Justice Douglas, in dissent, would have liked to
hear arguments on the constitutional issue.89 Noting that Congress’s
power to grant copyrights is circumscribed by the constitutional grant,
he asked, “Is a sculptor an ‘author’ and is his statue a ‘writing’ within
the meaning of the Constitution? We have never decided the question.”90
Justice Douglas explained that the Copyright Office had supplied a long
list of registered articles, including bookends, clocks, lamps, inkstands,
piggy banks, and casseroles. “Perhaps,” he wrote, “these are all ‘writings’ in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obviously so.”91 The Supreme Court had passed up an opportunity to provide
some guidance on the constitutional boundaries of authorship.
The 1976 Copyright Act, the most recent large-scale revision of U.S.
copyright law, attempted to address a number of the major issues bubbling up through the case law.92 Section 102(a) announced that copyright subsists in “original works of authorship,” although it did not define any of these words.93 The Act included a list of seven categories of
copyrightable works of authorship,94 but the House report accompanying
the legislation clarified that this list was not meant to be exhaustive.95
88

Id. at 206 n.5.
Id. at 219 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 220.
91
Id. at 221.
92
See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 22–34 (2001) (describing the drafting of copyright legislation).
93
Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 Vill. L. Rev.
251, 292 (2011) (“The Copyright Act does not attempt to define the nature of the crucial
species at the heart of all copyright doctrine—the work of authorship.”).
94
The list included:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
95
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (“The
second sentence of section 102 lists seven broad categories which the concept of ‘works’ of
authorship’ is said to ‘include.’ The use of the word ‘include,’ as defined in section 101,
makes clear that the listing is ‘illustrative and not limitative,’ and that the seven categories
do not necessarily exhaust the scope of ‘original works of authorship’ that the bill is intended
89
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Moreover, Congress explained that it was expressly avoiding exhausting
its constitutional power.96 Accordingly, there could be some constitutional “Writings” of “Authors” that would not receive statutory protection. This was made clear when Congress extended copyright protection
to architectural works in 1990, increasing the list to eight categories.97
The following subsection, 102(b), explained that not all aspects of a
work would receive copyright protection. It reads, “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”98 Section 102(b) is typically understood to involve two separate functions.99 First, it separates copyrightable authorship from the public domain. Ideas, concepts, and
principles cannot be owned by anyone and are free to all to use.100 This
is the so-called idea/expression dichotomy.101 Second, Section 102(b)
attempts to distinguish copyrightable authorship from patentable subject
matter in the same manner that Baker did.102 Procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, and discoveries can only receive intellectual
property (“IP”) protection if they meet the more stringent requirements
of patent law.103 Thus, Section 102(b) is sometimes said to be a “negative” element of copyrightability.104
Despite the scope of the revision undertaken in the 1976 Act, Congress provided little guidance about important concepts and terms in the
new law. Congress chose not to define the words authorship, original,
process, or procedure, but instead adopted the definitions of these terms

to protect. Rather, the list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but with
sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories.”) (footnote omitted).
96
Id. at 51 (“In using the phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ rather than ‘all the writings of an author’ now in section 4 of the statute, the committee’s purpose is to avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to eliminate the
uncertainties arising from the latter phrase.”).
97
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 703, 104 Stat.
5133, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)).
98
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
99
Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright in a Global Information Economy 81 (3d ed. 2010).
100
Id.
101
See infra notes 116–25 and accompanying text.
102
Cohen et al., supra note 99, at 81.
103
See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
104
Cohen et al., supra note 99, at 47.
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as they had been worked out in case law.105 The next Subsection will
explore how recent courts have attempted to grapple with the
idea/expression dichotomy and Section 102(b) in the face of the limited
guidance Congress has provided.
The Supreme Court’s most substantial discussion of authorship in the
1976 Act era came in the 1991 case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.106 The plaintiff, Rural, had produced a white pages telephone directory that the defendant copied. According to the Court,
the plaintiff’s directory was not copyrightable, because it was not “original,” and originality is a constitutionally imposed limitation on copyright law.107 The Court explained:
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright
protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term
is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as
they possess some creative spark, “no matter how crude, humble or
obvious” it might be.108

Congress could not constitutionally extend copyright protection to
works that were not independently created and that demonstrated less
than minimal creativity. For works like the plaintiff’s, which was a
compilation of uncopyrightable facts about people, their addresses, and
their phone numbers, the requisite originality and creativity must arise in
105
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664
(“The phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is intended to
incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts under the
present copyright statute.”); Newman, supra note 93, at 292.
106
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
107
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346, 364. The Court explained:
Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of Congress’ power to enact
copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress
to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings.” In two decisions from the late 19th century—The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879); and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)—
this Court defined the crucial terms “authors” and “writings.” In so doing, the Court
made it unmistakably clear that these terms presuppose a degree of originality.
Id. at 346 (alteration in original).
108
Id. at 345 (citations omitted).
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the manner by which the author selects, coordinates, and arranges the
relevant facts.109 In this case, however, the plaintiff’s directory failed to
meet these low standards. The Court described it as “entirely typical,”
“garden-variety,” and “devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity.”110
The Court’s opinion in Feist has proven unsatisfactory on a number
of grounds. It seems to conflate the requirements of originality (that is,
independent creation) and creativity (that is, a threshold of cleverness or
novelty).111 It has also provided very little guidance on what creativity
means and how it is to be judged.112 Just as importantly, the Court’s
opinion says virtually nothing about the kind of creativity that matters
for authorship.113 The Court never asked whether any of the decisions
the plaintiff made constituted “authorship.” Did Rural actually do anything that we can call authorship when it compiled and listed names, addresses, and phone numbers? People select, coordinate, and arrange
things all of the time and for all sorts of reasons, but not all compilations
are authorship. As noted in the Introduction of this Article, many innovations are independently created and more than trivially creative. Many
decisions that creators make were not copied from other sources and
demonstrate some degree of novelty and cleverness. But clearly all of
these are not copyrightable authorship. Authorship must entail something more than originality and more than trivial creativity.

109
Id. at 348 (“These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently
original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws.”).
110
Id. at 362.
111
Bridy, supra note 19, at 8.
112
Id. Bridy writes, “Copyright scholars have been nearly uniformly critical of the Court’s
failure in Feist to give any real content to the creativity requirement.” Id.; see also Russ VerSteeg, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, in 1 Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age, 1, 4 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (“Although the opinion established a rule that requires ‘creativity’ as an element required for
originality (and hence copyrightability), Feist does not define ‘creativity.’”).
113
The Court quotes Burrow-Giles for the proposition that “an author who claims infringement must prove ‘the existence of . . . intellectual production, of thought, and conception.’” Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (alteration in original) (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59–
60).
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B. Ideas, Expression, and Unconstrained Choice
To the extent that copyright law has worked out a theory of authorship, that theory seems to propose that authors express ideas.114 Copyright attaches to the original and more than minimally creative aspects of
authors’ expression, but not to the underlying ideas themselves. Below I
argue that this account of what authors do is incorrect.115 Authors do
much more than merely express ideas. Here, though, I aim to show that
even if the theory were correct, it cannot provide satisfactory answers to
fundamental doctrinal questions in copyright law.
1. Ideas and Expression in Traditional Media
To begin, consider the easiest and most central varieties of copyright
authorship—fiction, music, and painting. According to the
idea/expression dichotomy, an author of a novel cannot copyright the
novel’s ideas, only the particular way that he has expressed those ideas.116 He cannot copyright what the novel is “about,” but rather how he
expresses what it is about.117 But how should we draw the line? One
possibility is that the author’s copyrightable expression is limited to the
specific, literal way in which he expressed some idea. But as Judge
Learned Hand claimed, “It is of course essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has never
been the law.”118 Then how far into the nonliteral elements of the novel
does the concept of expression extend? Surely Joseph Heller cannot obtain a copyright in “war satire” based on his authorship of Catch-22. But
what about the novel’s plot, its characters, or even the term “catch-22”?
At what point does Heller’s work in writing the book stop being an uncopyrightable “idea” and become his copyrightable “expression”? Judge
Hand, himself, admitted to considerable uncertainty and even dismay:

114

See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899) (noting that copyright protects “that arrangement of words which the author has selected to express his ideas”).
115
See infra Section II.B.
116
Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 Ind. L.J. 175, 212 (1990)
[hereinafter Cohen, Objectivity].
117
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
118
Id.
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Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could
prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression,
his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can.119

Yet as difficult as these questions are for fiction,120 they may be even
more complicated for music or paintings. We might be able to struggle
towards general statements of what Blank Space and Guernica are
about. But how can we even say what a painting by Piet Mondrian or a
composition by Arnold Schoenberg is “about” so we can begin the process of differentiating ideas from expression?
As numerous judges and scholars have described, application of the
idea/expression dichotomy has been woefully unsatisfactory.121 Amy
Cohen and Rebecca Tushnet have separately cataloged numerous instances in which courts have reached nonsensical or contradictory opinions about which aspects of a work constitute its “ideas” and which its
“expression.”122 In Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, the court held

119

Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 48 (1967) (“We are in a viscid
quandary once we admit that ‘expression’ can consist of anything not close aboard the particular collocation in its sequential order.”).
121
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587–88 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The distinction between an
idea and its expression is an elusive one.”); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,
446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (“At least in close cases, one may suspect, the classification the court selects may simply state the result reached rather than the reason for it.”);
Fournier v. Erickson, 202 F. Supp. 2d 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he distinction between
the concept and the expression of the concept is a difficult one . . . .”); Cohen, Objectivity,
supra note 116, at 212 (arguing that in differentiating ideas from expression in visual arts
cases, courts inevitably apply aesthetic judgments); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in
Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1151, 1172 (2007) (“[D]isputes about copyright
scope become disputes about identifying those expressions that should be treated ‘like’ ideas.”); Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass
Communications World, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 735, 736 (1967); Eva E. Subotnik, Originality
Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 1487, 1489–90
(2011); Tushnet, supra note 74, at 715.
122
Cohen, Objectivity, supra note 116, at 210–20; Tushnet, supra note 74, at 724–32. For
example, Tushnet shows how courts treat “realist” and “non-realist” art differently. And
120
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that plaintiff’s photo of a businessman’s shoes and lower legs, taken
from the top of a building looking down at the street below, was not infringed by a similar photo by the defendant, because all of the similarities came from the ideas and not their expression.123 In a later case,
however, Judge Kaplan tried to determine what the idea of the plaintiff’s
photo really was:
Is it (1) a businessman contemplating suicide by jumping from a
building, (2) a businessman contemplating suicide by jumping from a
building, seen from the vantage point of the businessman, with his
shoes set against the street far below, or perhaps something more general, such as (3) a sense of desperation produced by urban professional
life?124

The idea/expression dichotomy does not provide the answer, motivating
the judge to suggest that the entire distinction between ideas and expression breaks down in visual arts.125 Presumably he would agree about
music, as well.
2. Systems, Processes, and Taxonomies
And yet the task of separating idea from expression gets more intractable as we move away from core copyright media, especially those that
potentially run afoul of Section 102(b)’s prohibition on copyright protection for systems and processes. To deal with these challenges, judges
have sought different doctrinal approaches to the question of authorship.
Consider the situation in American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans
Ass’n.126 The plaintiffs asserted a copyright in a “Code on Dental Procedures and Nomenclatures,” which classified dental procedures into
groups and assigned each a five-digit code number.127 The defendant argued that the code was an uncopyrightable “system,” and the district
court agreed.128 Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, however,
courts in the same circuit have reached opposing conclusions about whether the design of
toys constituted ideas or expression. See Cohen, Objectivity, supra note 116, at 213–15.
123
133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
124
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
125
Id. at 458. Judge Kaplan explained, “[I]t is not clear that there is any real distinction
between the idea in a work of art and its expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is
to depict a particular subject in a particular way.” Id.
126
126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
127
Id. at 977.
128
Id. at 980.
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viewed the code as a “taxonomy” rather than a system and upheld its
copyright.129 But what ideas were the authors of the code trying to express? Perhaps something about the relationship between “guided tissue
regeneration” and “pulp therapy, primary anterior.” Interestingly, Judge
Easterbrook never asks. Instead, he notes that “[c]lassification is a creative endeavor,”130 and he focuses on choices that the authors made in the
way they arranged the code. He explains:
The number assigned to any one of the three descriptions could have
had four or six digits rather than five; guided tissue regeneration could
have been placed in the 2500 series rather than the 4200 series; again
any of these choices is original to the author of the taxonomy, and another author could do things differently.131

Because the procedures could be classified in “any of a dozen different
ways,” Easterbrook presumes that the choices made by the authors were
“creative,” and thus copyrightable.132
The focus of the opinion in American Dental Ass’n on authorial
choice is, most likely, the progeny of Burrow-Giles, the nineteenthcentury photography case.133 As in that case, so too here the author’s
contribution is deemed to emerge from the choices that he makes about
the creation of the work. In neither case, however, do the courts interrogate why those choices were made. In Burrow-Giles, presumably the answer was to create a “harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture.”134 But why did the American Dental Association (“ADA”) authors
make the choices that they did? Easterbrook does not care, as long as

129

Id. (“This taxonomy does not come with instructions for use, as if the Code were a recipe for a new dish. A dictionary cannot be called a ‘system’ just because new novels are
written using words, all of which appear in the dictionary.” (citation omitted)).
130
Id. at 979.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See supra notes 69–74.
134
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54.
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they and others could have made other choices.135 Copyright authors no
longer express ideas; they choose among options.136
Interestingly, Judge Easterbrook distinguishes the copyrightable taxonomy at issue in American Dental Ass’n from culinary recipes, which
he deems uncopyrightable processes.137 A year earlier, a different panel
of the Seventh Circuit held that new recipes created by the plaintiff were
uncopyrightable.138 The court wrote:
The identification of ingredients necessary for the preparation of
each dish is a statement of facts. There is no expressive element in
each listing; in other words, the author who wrote down the ingredients for “Curried Turkey and Peanut Salad” was not giving literary
expression to his individual creative labors. Instead, he was writing
down an idea, namely, the ingredients necessary to the preparation of
a particular dish.139

The court continues, “The recipes at issue here describe a procedure by
which the reader may produce many dishes featuring Dannon yogurt. As
such, they are excluded from copyright protection as either a ‘procedure,
process, [or] system.’”140 Importantly, the court never considers the
plaintiff’s choices with respect to which ingredients to include in each
135
Judge Easterbrook’s focus on choice and the range of available options is likely a product of his economic approach to the law. As long as other ways of doing what the author did
are available to others, the strength of the copyright monopoly will tend to not be excessively
anticompetitive. But Easterbrook never asks whether the other options were as good, as efficient, and as functional. If not, the copyright in the code could have substantial anticompetitive effects.
136
A similar approach is taken in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d
674, 682–83 (2d Cir. 1998) (“In sum, creativity in selection and arrangement therefore is a
function of (i) the total number of options available, (ii) external factors that limit the viability of certain options and render others non-creative, and (iii) prior uses that render certain
selections ‘garden variety.’”); see also Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d
923, 928 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding copyright in “tables configured in an optional way, tables that are the product of format choices that are not unavoidable, for which indeed there
were an immense number of alternative combinations any one of which HAB was free to use
in lieu of Bucklew’s”). Judge Kaplan made a similar reference in Mannion v. Coors Brewing
Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“It is possible to imagine any number of
depictions of a black man wearing a white T-shirt and ‘bling bling’ that look nothing like
either of the photographs at issue here.”).
137
He writes, “This taxonomy does not come with instructions for use, as if the Code were
a recipe for a new dish.” Am. Dental Ass’n, 126 F.3d at 980.
138
Publ’ns Int’l v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996).
139
Id. at 480.
140
Id. at 481 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)).
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dish. As with the procedures at issue in American Dental Ass’n, ingredients do not supply their own principles of organization. Yet, these decisions are deemed a process or system, while the choices for how to arrange dental procedures were deemed expressive.
3. Software
The devolution of authorship from creative expression to unconstrained choice in copyright jurisprudence is especially evident in the
context of computer software. Computer programs have been deemed to
be copyrightable literary works since the 1960s.141 They were granted
copyright protection following a congressionally-commissioned report
by the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works.142 The report’s discussion of the constitutionality of extending copyright to computer programs is very brief. It notes that “a program is created, as are most copyrighted works, by placing symbols in a
medium. In this respect, it is the same as a novel, poem, play, musical
score, blueprint, advertisement, or telephone directory.”143 This analogy
was deemed sufficient for accepting software as a writing of an author.
Even though software is copyrightable, its author cannot receive a
copyright in every aspect of the program. According to the House report,
programs are copyrightable “to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas, as distinguished
from the ideas themselves.”144 The trick, however, has been in determining which aspects of “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”145 are ideas and which are expression.146 This inquiry is further
141
See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 Duke L.J. 663, 692–99 (discussing
the history of computer software copyright).
142
Nat’l Comm’n on New Tech. Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report (1979) [hereinafter CONTU].
143
Id. at 15.
144
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667. Also, note the House report’s odd suggestion that the ideas must be original rather than that the
expression must be original.
145
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
146
Pamela Samuelson discusses four different ways that courts have attempted to distinguish between copyrightable expression and patentable function in computer programs.
Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests
for Software Copyright Infringement 3 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. L. Research Paper No. 2667740,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2667740 [https://perma.cc/Q8UC-AKYY].
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complicated by the nature of computer programs, which are instructions
intended to produce a given set of functional results—for example, to
add numbers or display text and graphics.147 These functional elements
are not part of a program’s protectable expression and must be filtered
out.148
Some commentators have suggested that “computer programs of great
elegance and complexity can be written. The choice of logic elements,
their pattern, sequence, and significance are as fundamental to programmers’ expression as the choice of words, their sequence, and significance are to the poets’ expression.”149 Judges apparently have not felt
up to the task of appreciating the elegance of software. Instead, they
have typically focused their attention on the programmer’s choices and
their relationship to the program’s function.150
The ongoing litigation in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.151 offers an ideal example of the authorship-as-choice paradigm and a
demonstration of its limits.152 The plaintiff, Oracle, claims the copyright
in thirty-seven packages of computer software that function as an appli-

147
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2316 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto]
(“A crucially important characteristic of [computer] programs is that they behave; programs
exist to make computers perform tasks.”).
148
Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d Cir. 1992).
149
Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1493, 1533
(1987). Samuelson has expressed skepticism about the importance of elegance to computer
software: “No one would want to buy a program that did not behave, i.e., that did nothing, no
matter how elegant the source code ‘prose’ expressing that nothing.” Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 147, at 2317.
150
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The district
court held that the Lotus menu command hierarchy, with its specific choice and arrangement
of command terms, constituted an ‘expression’ of the ‘idea’ of operating a computer program with commands arranged hierarchically into menus and submenus.”); Whelan Assocs.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230 (3d Cir. 1986) (“As the program structure is refined, the programmer must make decisions about what data are needed, where along the
program’s operations the data should be introduced, how the data should be inputted, and
how it should be combined with other data.”).
151
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
152
For a helpful primer on the case, see Christopher Jon Sprigman, Oracle v. Google: The
High Stakes Legal Fight for the Software Industry, 58 Comm. ACM, May 2015, at 27, 27;
see also Pamela Samuelson, Three Fundamental Flaws in CAFC’s Oracle v. Google Decision, 37 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 702, 702, 706–08 (2015) (critiquing the Federal Circuit’s decision).
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cation programming interface (“API”).153 Google copied parts of the
API into its own Android software, and Oracle filed suit for copyright
infringement. The district court ruled that the programs were uncopyrightable because each is “a command structure, a system or method of
operation.”154
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court had to determine whether
the programs contained any copyrightable authorship. First, the court
explained that just because a program looks like a “method of operation,” and even if its developers refer to it as a “method,”155 it will not
automatically fall afoul of Section 102(b).156 Commands to a computer
to carry out a task may be copyrightable if they contain “any separable
expression.”157 Next, the court suggests that it should look for this separable expression in the creative choices made by the programmers. As
with other copyright cases, the court does not define “creative.” It notes,
however, that the “developers had a vast range of options for the [program’s] structure and organization.”158 For example, the authors “had to
determine whether to include a java.text package in the first place, how
long the package would be, what elements to include, how to organize
that package, and how it would relate to other packages.”159 Moreover,
the court repeatedly notes that the defendant, Google, also had plenty of
ways it could have written the program other than the ones used by the
plaintiff.160 This suggests that the plaintiff’s choices were creative and
not constrained. Accordingly, the court found that the programs are expressive and not a system or method in violation of Section 102(b).161

153
Oracle Am., 750 F.3d at 1347. APIs “allow programmers to use the pre-written code to
build certain functions into their own programs, rather than write their own code to perform
those functions from scratch.” Id. at 1349.
154
Id. at 1352. The district court also found that “there is only one way to write” the relevant code, so the “merger doctrine bars anyone from claiming exclusive copyright ownership
of that expression.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
155
Id. at 1349.
156
Id. at 1366 (citing Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986);
Apple Comput. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250–52 (3d Cir. 1983)).
157
Id. at 1367. The court appears to require a version of the functional separability test applied to useful articles in copyright jurisprudence but typically deemed inappropriate to literary works. See Am. Dental Ass’n, 126 F.3d at 980.
158
Oracle Am., 750 F.3d at 1356; see also id. at 1361 (“The focus is . . . on the options that
were available to [the author] at the time it created the API packages.”).
159
Id. at 1361 n.6.
160
Id. at 1361.
161
Id. at 1368.
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In so holding, the court did not engage in a hunt for actual expressive
content in the programs. Instead of analyzing the programs, the court
rested its opinion on a syllogism: Programs are expressive if they are
creative; programs are creative if they involve unconstrained choices;
the plaintiff made unconstrained choices so its programs are expressive.
At no point, however, did the court inquire into the nature of the choices
that the plaintiff’s programmers made. It notes, for example, that they
had to choose what elements to include in the programs, but it does not
pause to wonder why they chose to include the elements that they did. If
authorship means anything more than simple freedom to choose, then
courts presumably need to interrogate the nature of the choices that putative authors make. Perhaps the court’s approach should be blamed on
Feist’s focus on originality and creativity without asking what was original or creative.
***
American copyright law has failed to work out a coherent theory of
authorship in its two centuries of existence. Faced with narrow disputes
or concerned about practical issues, courts have generally ignored larger
questions about the constitutional boundaries of the terms “Authors” and
“Writings.” In their failure to address broader theoretical questions,
though, the courts have left us with uncertainty and arbitrariness. How
do we distinguish ideas from expression in photographs and works of
visual art? Why is a code a copyrightable taxonomy but a recipe is an
uncopyrightable process? And which decisions of a computer programmer matter for determining whether software is copyrightable? Questions like these will become increasingly frequent in the years to come.
New media and the Internet are continuing to provide novel opportunities for creativity. Artificial intelligence is challenging traditional notions of authorship. And big data and the “Internet of Things” are opening up new and lucrative arenas in which computer code and copyright
law interact.
II. A THEORY OF AUTHORS AND WRITINGS
The doctrinal challenges addressed above are not fundamentally intractable. They arise, instead, because courts and scholars have done an
insufficient job of understanding the relationship between authors and
writings. The theory of authorship put forward here solves these prob-
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lems by offering a coherent and comprehensive account of the authorwriting relationship.
A. What Kind of Theory?
Authorship is a central aspect of contemporary aesthetic theory and
literary criticism, and the approach to authorship that this Article propounds borrows from those bodies of work. But lawyers are asking different kinds of questions from critics and philosophers when they write
about authorship, so my approach will also diverge from aesthetic and
literary theory in important ways. Copyright law needs a theory of authorship that is consistent with its broader constitutional principle of optimizing creative production by balancing the interests of creators and
the public.
The concept of authorship has provided fodder for philosophers for
centuries,162 but authorship emerged as a site of deep theoretical assessment in the second half of the twentieth century.163 Philosophers of aesthetics debated the nature of art, authorship, and authority.164 They offered definitions of “art” and analyzed the meaning of authorship in the
context of “appropriation art,” where artists repurpose other artists’
work.165 Film scholars developed and challenged auteur theory to describe which of the many people involved in a movie should count as its
author.166 And, perhaps most importantly, literary scholars contested the
role of authorial intent and the meaning of texts in debates that spilled

162

Stephen Donovan et al., Introduction: Author, Authorship, Authority, and Other Matters, in Authority Matters: Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Authorship 1, 1 (Stephen
Donovan et al. eds., 2008) (“But what authorship is, how it should be determined, and why it
is important have actually been the subjects of contentious cultural debates for centuries.”).
163
See Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern xv–xvi (Seán Burke ed., 1995).
164
See, e.g., Jerrold Levinson, Music, Art and Metaphysics 3–11 (1990); Monroe C.
Beardsley, An Aesthetic Definition of Art, in What is Art? 15, 17 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1983);
Arthur C. Danto, Artwork and Real Things, 39 Theoria 1, 12–14 (1973).
165
Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. Phil. 571, 580–81 (1964) (discussing ready-made
works and Warhol); Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1155, 1157–58 (2013) [hereinafter Hick, Appropriation];
Sherri Irvin, Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art, 45 Brit. J. Aesthetics 123,
125–26 (2005) (“The appropriation artists are interesting because their authorship relation to
their work appears to be compromised from the start by the inclusion of large components of
other people’s artworks, sometimes almost unmediated.”).
166
Robert Stam, Film Theory: An Introduction 85 (2000); Jack Stillinger, Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius 178–79 (1991); Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning
in the Cinema 74 (3d ed. 1972).
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onto the pages of newspapers and other popular fora.167 The critic Roland Barthes went so far as to declare the “death of the author.”168
The theories that have emerged from these fields have produced important new ways of thinking about art and authorship, and they have
even influenced legal scholars169 and judges.170 As valuable as they have
been, however, they do not necessarily provide answers for all of the
kinds of questions that copyright law asks. When aesthetic philosophers
attempt to define “art,” their definitions do not necessarily map onto the
constitutional category of “Writings,”171 although the techniques and arguments they use may prove helpful for copyright scholars.172 The same
goes for critical discussions of interpretation, meaning, and authorial intentions. Constitutionally, copyright law requires authors;173 it cannot

167
See Noël Carroll, Anglo-American Aesthetics and Contemporary Criticism: Intention
and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion, 51 J. Aesthetics & Art Criticism 245, 245–47 (1993);
W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in The Verbal Icon:
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry 3, 4–5 (1954) (“A poem can be only through its meaning—
since its medium is words—yet it is, simply is, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant.”).
168
Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in Image, Music, Text 142, 142–48 (Stephen
Heath trans., 1977); see also Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in Textual Strategies:
Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism 141, 149–50 (Josué V. Harari ed., 1979) (discussing the function of authorship in literary interpretation).
169
See Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of
Theory in Literacy and Legal Studies 87–102 (1989); Paul J. Heald, Guide to Law and Literature for Teachers, Students, and Researchers 3–6 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals
of Thoughts: The Intelligence of Emotions 236 (2001); Richard Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature 3–10 (1992).
170
Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 1–9 (1988).
171
Darren Hudson Hick, Toward an Ontology of Authored Works, 51 Brit. J. Aesthetics
185, 197 (2011) [hereinafter Hick, Ontology] (“Although there is a great deal of overlap between the class of art works and the class of authored works, there are many objects protected by copyright that we do not normally want to call art works . . . .”).
172
See Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 58 (1993); James
D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 Am. U. L. Rev.
625, 628–33 (1988); Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came to
View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1405, 1450 (2004); Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction, in The Construction of Authorship: Textual
Appropriation in Law and Literature 1, 2–10 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds.,
1994); Jaszi, supra note 3, at 455–56; Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:
Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 Eighteenth-Century
Stud. 425, 426 (1984); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 247, 266 (1998) (cataloguing the use of different aesthetic theories in resolving copyright cases).
173
Nimmer, supra note 3, at 210 (“[C]opyright law needs an author—or, rather, a certain
notion of ‘authorship’ as its principle of thrift.” (footnote omitted)).
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simply kill them off. Moreover, it need not do so, at least not in the way
that literary theories describe. What copyright law needs is a theory of
authorship and writings that is consistent with and responsive to its constitutional goals.
My approach to interpreting the constitutional text uses a variety of
different modalities of interpretation, including historical, textual, structural, and prudential.174 My goal is to interpret the words “Authors” and
“Writings” in a way that is most consistent with how they were originally understood, how they have been understood over the past two centuries, and how they should be understood in light of changing technology,
media, and creativity. When these sources disagree, I prefer interpretations that are consistent with copyright law’s fundamental goal of optimizing creative production.
Most courts and scholars agree that, in the United States, copyright
law is founded on consequentialist principles involving the optimization
of creative production.175 This is implied by the Constitution’s grant of
powers to promote the progress of science.176 The law exists to ensure
that creators have the opportunity to recover the costs of their efforts by
providing them with a period of exclusive rights that allows them to
charge higher prices for their works.177 But copyright law also recognizes that the provision of rights is costly, and authors’ interests must be

174
See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12–13 (1991) (identifying six constitutional modalities: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential).
175
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The Court explained:
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d
Cir. 1992) (“The interest of the copyright law is not in simply conferring a monopoly on industrious persons, but in advancing the public welfare through rewarding artistic creativity,
in a manner that permits the free use and development of non-protectable ideas and processes.”).
176
Oliar, supra note 4, at 1773; Solum, supra note 4, at 11.
177
According to the Court in Mazer v. Stein: “The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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balanced with those of the public and of future creators.178 Accordingly,
copyright law involves a trade-off between these competing interests,
and its doctrines should reflect that balance.
My theory of authorship and writings embraces the consequentialist
foundation of U.S. copyright law.179 It attempts to understand the constitutional terms “Authors” and “Writings” in a way that is consistent with
such a foundation. My theory is not narrowly confined to the meanings
of these terms as fixed at the time of the Founding. Neither Congress nor
the courts have ever adopted such a strategy given the constant stream of
new media.180 Nor does my approach treat these concepts as entirely unconstrained by the constitutional text. Congress cannot declare anyone
an author or anything a writing by fiat, even if doing so would promote
the progress of science.181 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, these terms place limits on congressional authority.182 Just because “Writings” are not limited to the technologically available means
of the Framing generation does not imply that the term is not limited at
all.183
178

Id.
This is not to say that the theory is inappropriate for other legal systems grounded in
natural rights principles. For a theory of authorship that shares some features of mine but
which is grounded in a Kantian rights-based approach, see Drassinower, supra note 5, at
112–13.
180
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664
(“Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to
foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take.”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–57 (1884). Lawrence Solum, who adopts an originalist approach to interpreting the Copyright Clause, even rejects such a strict interpretation of the
term “Writings.” He notes:
Although an argument might be made that the copyright power is limited to the particular forms of writing used at the time of the framing, this crabbed construction
would seem inconsistent with the term chosen, “Writings,” in light of the technological variety already present at the time of the framing . . . .
Solum, supra note 4, at 43.
181
1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.10[A][2](b) (2009)
(“Nor may Congress simply create a legal fiction that a record producer is an ‘author’ if in
fact he is not.”); Oliar, supra note 4, at 1778–79.
182
Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 220
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“The power is thus circumscribed: it allows a monopoly to be
granted only to ‘authors’ for their ‘writings.’”).
183
The constitutional references to “Authors” and “Writings” specify the means by which
Congress is empowered to promote the progress of science. If Congress wishes to promote
the progress of science by granting certain rights to people who are not authors or for things
that are not writings, it must locate that authority in another clause of the Constitution. See
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 418–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 492 F.3d
179
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My goal, then, is to offer a theory of copyright authorship that is
grounded in the law’s founding principles, and that understands the constitutional text in a way that is consistent with those principles and the
manner in which the text has been traditionally understood. It departs
from accepted understandings when necessary to construct the best possible reading of the constitutional text in light of new developments in
creativity, technology, and media.
B. Authors and Writings
For purposes of copyright law, an author is a human being who intends to produce one or more mental effects in an audience by an external manifestation of behavior. A writing is any medium through which
the mental effects are to be conveyed. Copyright can subsist not in the
mental effects produced but rather in the manner by which the effects
are produced if that manner is original to the author, at least minimally
creative, and fixed for a period of more than merely transitory duration.
The remainder of this Section explicates aspects of this theory.
1. Intentions
The theory proposed here adopts an intentionalist account of authorship. I will explain what kinds of intentions matter, why intentions
should matter, and briefly, how they may be ascertainable. To begin,
however, I should point out that my theory assumes that people can have
intentions to perform behaviors and that their intentions are ascertainable by others. These assumptions are consistent with IP doctrine and
with legal theory in general.184

140, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding constitutionality of antibootlegging statute on Commerce Clause grounds).
184
IP law distinguishes certain classes of conduct as “willful” on the assumption that people have certain aims and that they are capable of acting on those aims. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(2) (2012) (discussing damages for willful infringement of copyright). It also assumes that others, in particular, courts, can ascertain what people’s intentions are. The possibility of intentional behavior is broadly assumed by the law even if it is occasionally questioned. There is an enormous literature on the philosophy of intentions and actions that I do
not grapple with in this Article. See G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (2d ed. 2000). This literature considers the relationship between actors’ mental states, behaviors, and their results in
the world. The implications of this field for copyright law remain to be explored. For work in
a similar vein, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2735850 [https://perma.cc/6Z6U-E79W].
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Not all of a person’s intentions matter for purposes of deciding
whether she is an author or not. The philosopher Jerrold Levinson distinguishes two categories of intentions that people may have about the
works that they create: semantic intentions and categorial intentions.185
Semantic intentions are those having to do with the meaning or interpretation of the work.186 For example, a person may intend that the song she
has written be understood as a parody. Depending on a number of factors, including the writer’s abilities and the sophistication of her audience, she may succeed or fail at having her audience appreciate the
song’s parodic character. Semantic intentions have been at the center of
aesthetic and literary theory for the past half-century, but they are not
important for determining whether a person is an author.187
The intentions that matter for copyright authorship are a person’s categorial intentions. As the term suggests, categorial intentions are those
about what kind of work the person has created.188 Levinson explains:
Categorial intentions involve the maker’s framing and positioning of
his product vis-à-vis his projected audience; they involve the maker’s
conception of what he has produced and what it is for, on a rather
basic level; they govern not what a work is to mean but how it is to be
fundamentally conceived or approached.189

For example, when a person strings together a series of words on a page,
she may intend that the words be taken as a poem or as a grocery list or
as a law review article. This intention for how the string of words is to
be conceptualized is different from any particular meaning that the person intends those words to convey.190 And, as Levinson argues, unlike
semantic intentions, categorial intentions “virtually cannot fail—so long
as the text in question at least allows of being taken, among other things,
185

Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays 188 (1996).
Id. He writes, “An author’s intention to mean something in or by a text T (a semantic
intention) is one thing, whereas an author’s intention that T be classified or taken in some
specific or general way (a categorial intention) is quite another.” Id.
187
This does not mean that semantic intentions are never important for copyright law. Semantic intentions may matter for determining whether the defendant’s copying was wrongful
and whether it should qualify as fair use.
188
Levinson, supra note 185, at 188.
189
Id.
190
Mark Rollins, What Monet Meant: Intention and Attention in Understanding Art, 62 J.
Aesthetics & Art Criticism 175, 177–78 (2004) (“[T]o intend for an object to be conceptualized under a general heading does not require, nor is it identical to, intending that a specific
meaning be attributed to it.”).
186
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as a poem[,]” grocery list, or law review article.191 Finally, a person’s
categorial intentions about something she creates are extrinsic to the
work that she has created. They cannot necessarily be discovered within
the work itself, but rather are manifest by the person’s behaviors and
mental states (although the resulting work may provide evidence of
those behaviors and mental states).192
For purposes of copyright law, then, a person may be considered an
author when she has the categorial intention that her creation is capable
of producing mental effects in an audience. The next Subsection will explain what is meant by mental effects. For now, though, it is enough to
understand that a putative author must decide and register to herself that
the thing that she has created, or some aspect of it, should produce an effect on the minds of audience members that experience it. Of course,
some creators, including diarists, may never intend for their works to be
perceived by an audience. Nonetheless, their behaviors fall within my
schema as well. More fully but less aesthetically put, the intentions that
matter for copyright authorship are the intentions to produce mental effects in an audience should an audience perceive the work.193
Importantly, we need not care what mental effect the putative author
intends to create. Particular mental effects, such as particular meanings
or emotions, are the province of semantic intentions and are irrelevant to
determining whether a person is an author. Consider the following examples. Alice constructs a three-dimensional object intending that when
people interact with it, by looking at it and touching it, they will experience certain feelings, thoughts, and sensations. Bill constructs a similar
three-dimensional object intending that it will serve as a part of a house
where, after it is installed, no one will see it or interact with it. Cass also
constructs a similar object. He intends that it will be used to hold flow191

Levinson, supra note 185, at 188.
Rollins, supra note 190, at 178; C. Paul Sellors, Collective Authorship in Film, 65 J.
Aesthetics & Art Criticism 263, 263 (2007) (“Authorship is not a concept to be derived from
a text but an intentional action of an intending agent that causes a text.”).
193
Prior to the adoption of the 1976 Act, unpublished works were excluded from the federal copyright system and were protected, if at all, by state common law copyright. See William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An
Economic Approach, 21 J. Legal Stud. 79, 88 (1992). Starting with the 1976 Act, however,
works receive protection from the moment they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Although a theory of authorship could require publication as a criterion of copyrightability, my approach assumes that Congress did not act unconstitutionally when it extended
protection to unpublished works. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99,
127–28 (2000).
192
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ers, and he also intends that when people see it they will experience certain feelings, thoughts, and sensations. Alice and Cass have engaged in
authorship, while Bill has not. Further, Bill has not engaged in authorship even if a construction worker installing his object decides that it is
beautiful and uses it as a centerpiece on his kitchen table. Since Bill
never had the categorial intention that the object produce ideas or feelings, whether of beauty or of anything else, he lacks the requisite mental
state for authorship.
To be clear, the intentions that matter at this point of the inquiry are
creators’ categorial intentions to produce mental effects, not their intentions about the specific effects they intended. To determine whether a
given text is the writing of an author, copyright law need not concern itself with what someone thinks he has authored; it only needs to be concerned with whether he deemed himself as authoring. A sculptor may
intend to produce a representation of a lion, although to most viewers it
looks like a house cat.194 If he did not copy it from another work and if it
is at least minimally creative, the sculpture is clearly the writing of an
author, no matter how bad it is or how badly the author’s semantic intentions failed.195
But why should a person’s intentions matter at all? Why not count as
an author any person who does create mental effects, whether she intended to do so or not? First, as a matter of common usage, most people
would not refer to someone as an author who did not intentionally adopt
that stance for herself.196 A monkey might accidentally snap a cute
“selfie” on a smartphone or a toaster may happen to produce a likeness
of the Virgin Mary, but most people would not call the monkey or the
toaster “authors.”197
Second, interpreting the term “Authors” in light of the constitutional
purpose of promoting the progress of science, it makes little sense to extend authorial rights to people who do not intend that their creations be
treated as writings of authors. Copyright law promotes progress by
194
For examples of hilariously bad sculptural efforts, see Alanna Okun, 22 Statues That
Don’t Quite Look Right, BuzzFeed (Apr. 25, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ala
nnaokun/statues-that-dont-quite-look-right#.gdVdGGGvz [https://perma.cc/Y4ZG-LWHZ].
195
As others have pointed out, the author’s intentions with respect to what he has created
may matter for other areas of copyright law. See Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 469, 495–96 (2015); Yen, supra note 172, at 251–52.
196
Nimmer, supra note 3, at 204 (“[I]t would seem that intent is a necessary element of the
act of authorship.”).
197
See infra notes 217–20 with respect to human vs. nonhuman authors.
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providing incentives to people to create new works of authorship.198
These incentives work, if they do at all, ex ante—before the creative
work has been produced.199 But the rights that copyright law establishes
are costly to society.200 Accordingly, copyright law should limit the extension of rights to those people who are plausibly going to be affected
by the incentives it creates. If people do not intend their creations to be
treated as works of authorship, they obviously are not creating them because of the incentives that the law provides to works of authorship.
Granting such people copyrights generates social costs without any concomitant incentive benefit.201 For this reason, a putative author’s intentions should be assessed at the time of creation.202 A creator should not
be able to assert different intentions or adopt different readings of her
work after she has created it—at least not for purposes of subsequently
establishing a copyright.203
Ascertaining whether and how a given person intended to produce
mental effects in her audience may prove challenging, but it is not likely
to be more challenging than other situations in which the law must de198
Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 Tex. L.
Rev. 1921, 1935 (2014) (discussing the role of creative incentives in copyright and patent
law).
199
Id. at 1924.
200
Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992). (“The interest of
the copyright law is not in simply conferring a monopoly on industrious persons, but in advancing the public welfare through rewarding artistic creativity, in a manner that permits the
free use and development of non-protectable ideas and processes.”).
201
Think about the role of copyright incentives for distribution of created works.
202
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) states that:
A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time;
where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at
any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.
203
The issue here is similar to the one discussed by Judge Frank in Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.. See supra notes 82–83. For Frank, an author need not intend to create the aspects of the work that made it original and sufficiently creative as long as, having
accidentally produced them, she then adopted them as her own. Similarly, if a designer, intending to produce a functional bike rack, discovered that the object he produced was beautiful and harmonious in addition to functional, he should be allowed to adopt those aspects of
the work, and qualify as the author of a writing, if he does so at the time the work is created.
See Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying
copyright protection for a bicycle rack that started as a sculpture). The creative process is too
deeply driven by unconscious factors to allow for so strict a requirement. If, however, six
months later, a friend told him that his bike rack was beautiful and harmonious, the creator
could not then claim the intention to have produced those effects.
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termine an actor’s intentions.204 As always, opportunities for strategic
pleading may exist.205 In many situations, determining people’s categorial intentions will be straightforward. Composers of music generally intend that notes and melodies create effects in the minds of those who
hear the music. The same principle holds for poets, photographers, and
chefs.206 The reverse is generally true for the creators of internal machine parts. Since these parts are rarely displayed to people, they are unlikely to be designed in such a way as to produce particular mental effects on people. Instead, their design is exclusively motivated by
efficiency and functionality. Furthermore, creators may tout their products’ efficiency in ways that will make it difficult to disclaim later on.
The range of available design options can provide a proxy for whether
a work or some aspect of it was intended to create mental effects, although it should not become the sole criterion of analysis as it did in
American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n and Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.207 For example, the diameter of a compact disc is
dictated by the constraints of the hardware on which it is played, so the
decision to give it that diameter was not likely to have been motivated
by the desire to create a particular mental effect in people who look at or
hold the CD. By looking at the number of available design options or the
degrees of design freedom involved in producing a given work, we can
get a sense of the likelihood that the aspects of the design that were selected were chosen on the basis of the desire to create mental effects rather than because of external constraints. While the creator of a painting
can select among a nearly infinite array of options in producing a work,
the creator of a tennis racquet is substantially more limited in her design
choices. Ultimately, however, the question courts should be asking is
204

See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268–69 (10th Cir.
2008) (inquiring into the creator’s intentions when designing a model of a car).
205
For examples of strategic pleading, see Amy Adler’s discussion of Jeffrey Koons’s approach to fair use. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 8), http://its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/representiveFiles/AAdlerFairUseFutureofArt-forthcoming_B86991AB-DC76-AD68-3D6776511B35B60A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BU8E-ZFZ3].
206
The appropriation artist Richard Prince disclaimed any particular “meaning” associated
with his work. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Prince testified that he has no interest in the original meaning of the photographs he uses. . . . Prince
testified that he doesn’t ‘really have a message’ he attempts to communicate when making
art.”), judgment rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
207
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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whether aspects of the work were intentionally chosen to produce mental
effects in an audience.
2. Mental Effects
What is it that authors do when they produce writings? What are the
aspects of writing poems, composing and performing music, filming
movies, and choreographing dances that make all of these diverse activities authorship? Moreover, how are the things that make each of these
behaviors authorship different from the behaviors associated with creating a new form of plastic, developing a light bulb, and improving the
fuel economy of an automobile such that the latter activities constitute
patentable inventorship? The answer given here is that the former were
all designed to produce mental effects in an audience while the latter
were not. The latter produce their effects not in the mind but in the rest
of the world.
The distinction in IP law between the objects of the copyright power
and the objects of the patent power reflects, in a way, the Cartesian distinction between mind and body/world.208 Copyrightable works of authorship produce effects209 in people’s minds. They generate thoughts,
feelings, emotions, and other states of cognition.210 Patentable inventions do their work elsewhere. They make things stronger, lighter, faster,
more efficient, and easier to use. Although having a faster computer may
make people happy,211 the emotion or mental state is not produced directly by an invention that increases the processing power of computer
hardware. Copyrightable works, by contrast, produce (or at least they are
intended to produce) direct mental effects on those who experience

208

For a critique of this distinction in the context of contemporary neuroscience, see Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain 87–88 (1994).
209
Philosophers and psychologists might instead use the term “images” here. See, e.g.,
VerSteeg, supra note 5, at 1340 (“As a precursor to the communication component of being
an author, an author generally, consciously or subconsciously, conceives a mental image (either visual or auditory) of his original expression.”). I worry that the term “images” excessively connotes visual media and denigrates works that are not as easily understood as visualized.
210
See Hick, Appropriation, supra note 165, at 1183 (“If we take an idea to be, roughly,
the content of a thought, feeling, emotion, desire, and/or other cognitive state or event, and
an expression to be the manifestation or embodiment of such an idea or ideas in a perceptible
form, then ‘expression’ will always be an ellipsis for ‘expression-of-an-idea’ or ‘expressionof-ideas.’”).
211
A proposition that I doubt.
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them.212 The claim here is similar to the distinction that Abraham
Drassinower makes between copyrightable works and patentable inventions. He writes, “[T]he distinction between patent and copyright is a
distinction between subject matter involving a relation between persons
and objects (patent), and subject matter involving a relation between
persons (copyright).”213
This distinction between mental effects and nonmental effects is intended to replace the notion that copyright law concerns “expression”
while patent law covers “function.”214 As the discussion of processes
and methods in Part I showed, distinguishing expression from function
has proven difficult.215 Rather than attempting to discern whether the
outcome of a sequence of steps is expressive or functional, we should
instead consider where the sequence produces its effect. If the effect is
in the mind, the sequence contains potentially copyrightable authorship.216
In producing mental effects, copyrightable works are aimed at human
audiences, while patentable inventions are not.217 This premise is easily
grasped in the context of objects that incorporate both copyrightable el-

212

Christopher Newman has described authorship in a similar manner. He writes:
A work of authorship is a planned sensory experience, designed by its author to give
rise to an expressive experience in the mind of one or more intended audiences. The
sensory experience consists of a specific selection and arrangement (spatial and/or
temporal) of sensory inputs that is perceived by the person “consuming” the work.
The expressive experience consists of a specific set (and for some works, a specific
sequence) of intellectual responses that the sensory experience is designed to arouse in
the mind of the audience.
Newman, supra note 93, at 292.
213
Drassinower, supra note 5, at 65.
214
For further discussion of this distinction see Buccafusco, Making Sense, supra note 3,
at 531–41.
215
Id. For example, Judge Richard Posner had no problem finding that a “sex aid”—or as
he preferred to call it, a “sexual device”—was useful. Ritchie v. Vast Res., Inc., 563 F.3d
1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Nevertheless . . . the plaintiffs’ invention is useful . . . .”).
There is, however, no attempt to explain why tactile pleasure is “useful” but visual or auditory pleasure is not.
216
Difficult questions about the copyrightability of pharmaceuticals that affect mental
states exist. My theory suggests that if a pharmaceutical is produced with the intention of
creating a particular set of mental effects, then the drug contains potentially copyrightable
authorship.
217
Cf. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1149,
1170 n.75 (1998) (“One may ask why expression must have a human object. Why not expression to a machine? One may, of course, employ such a metaphor if he chooses. But why
do so?”).
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ements and patentable elements.218 Consider aspects of a motorcycle, or
even a particular part of a motorcycle: the gas tank. Some aspects of the
gas tank’s design are not addressed to a human audience. A gas tank
must be hollow in order to hold gas, and it should be of a certain size to
hold enough gas, not weigh down the vehicle, and minimize drag. These
aspects of its design are potentially patentable inventions.219 Other aspects of its design, however, are addressed to a human audience. The
shape may be designed in such a way as to produce a sensation of sexiness, the color might be chosen to appear aggressive, and the curves of
the tank might produce a feeling of arousal when stroked. These aspects
of the design are potentially copyrightable authorship.220
In addition to clarifying the relationship between copyrightable authorship and patentable inventorship, the mental effects approach also
provides a better account of the idea/expression dichotomy. As described in Part I, courts and copyright scholars have tended to think of
authorship (if they have at all) as the expression of ideas.221 What copyright authors do is express ideas, and copyright attaches to the expression, but not to the underlying ideas. I prefer to avoid this language for
two principle reasons, one practical and one logical. As a practical matter, courts have found it incredibly difficult to apply the distinction between ideas and expression.222 Although these terms may work relatively
well for works like plays (the idea of Romeo and Juliet is “star-crossed
lovers” and the expression involves the particular words, plot, and char218
See J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
475, 511 (1995) (discussing legal hybrids).
219
They are patentable if they meet the constitutional and statutory requirements for patent
protection, including novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.
220
They are copyrightable if they meet the other requirements, including originality, minimal creativity, and fixation, and also fit within the statutorily protected categories of works.
221
See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (“[T]he
author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea
into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public
Address: On the Specificity of Copyright Vis-à-Vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 199, 204 (“[W]orks of authorship . . . invite and elicit dialogue about the ideas to
which they give expressive form.”); Hick, Appropriation, supra note 165, at 1183.
222
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587–88 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The distinction between an
idea and its expression is an elusive one.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d. Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can.”); Fournier v. Erickson, 202 F. Supp. 2d 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he distinction
between the concept and the expression of the concept is a difficult one . . . .”).
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acters that Shakespeare used),223 they are much more difficult to apply to
other copyrightable works.224 The idea/expression dichotomy asks us to
distinguish what a work is about from how that subject is made manifest.225 But what is the idea in a particular photograph, and how is it distinct from the expression of that idea?226 What a photograph or a nonobjective painting is “about” is often the particular manner of expression
used. The two terms collapse into each other. Similar problems arise
with computer software,227 sound recordings, and taxonomies.228 The
language of ideas and expressions does not provide firm and consistent
grounds for declaring which aspects of a work are potentially subject to
copyright.229
The mental effects language that I prefer is substantially easier to apply. Rather than asking which aspects of a work are ideas and which are
expressions of those ideas, we should ask which aspects of a work were
intended to create mental effects. For works like photographs, where the
creation of a mental effect was obviously intended, we need only consider the manner by which that effect was created. As I will explain below, copyright attaches to the manner or form by which the photogra223

But see Said, supra note 195, at 32 (questioning whether these inquiries are any easier
for fiction than for other works).
224
See Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting
that “[t]he idea/expression dichotomy arose in the context of literary copyright” and that it is
most useful there).
225
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
226
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 458–59 (“[T]hose elements of a photograph, or indeed,
any work of visual art protected by copyright, could just as easily be labeled ‘idea’ as ‘expression.”).
227
According to Weinreb:
A basic premise of the [CONTU] report is the proposition that a program expresses
the process that it generates as operations of a computer, much as the text of a book
expresses its plot or ideas. . . .
....
The representation of a program in code or some other symbolic form, like a
flowchart, may be copyrightable, to the extent that its concrete expression is original.
The program that is represented, however, contains no expression and is not copyrightable . . . .
Weinreb, supra note 217, at 1167–68.
228
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 291 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Roth,
J., dissenting) (“Is Southco’s ‘idea’ the use of a code to describe products or is it the use of
predetermined numbers to portray given characteristics of a particular product?”).
229
Consider this language from Fournier v. Erickson: “[D]efendants conclude that Fournier cannot assert copyright protection, to the extent that he does, over the expression of
businessmen in traditional dress on their way to work, an idea which originated with
McCann in any event.” 202 F. Supp. 2d 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added).
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pher attempted to achieve the production of a mental effect. For works
like computer code, instead of attempting to discern the code’s ideas
from the expression of those ideas, we should instead inquire into which
aspects of the code were intended to create mental effects. Perhaps the
programmer intended that those reading the code experience a feeling of
sadness, or perhaps she hoped that those viewing the code’s visual structure would be struck by its similarity to the calligrammes of Guillaume
Apollinaire.230 If so, then the choices that the programmer made about
how to produce those effects or impressions are the appropriate subject
of copyrightable authorship if they meet the other constitutional and
statutory requirements.231
The second and more fundamental objection to the language of ideas
and expressions is that it misconceives the nature of at least some kinds
of authorship. In order to distinguish ideas from expression, we are told
to ask what the copyrightable work is about.232 But some works are not
about anything.233 That is to say, some works are not intended to express
or communicate any semantic content at all.234 Instead, they are intended
to generate thoughts, feelings, or emotions in those who experience
them.235 A piece of classical music is not necessarily “about” anything,
nor is a painting by Jackson Pollock.236 These sorts of works do not necessarily have any meaning or any particular “ideas” embedded in

230

Recall that we need not care whether the code was actually successful in producing
these particular effects. These are the effects that emerge from the programmer’s semantic
intentions. All that matters to this theory is that the programmer had the categorial intention
that the program create some mental effects.
231
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d. 693, 708–09 (2d Cir. 1992) (filtering
out of the copyright analysis aspects of a computer program that were dictated by efficiency
concerns).
232
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
233
And this includes more than the television program Seinfeld.
234
The appropriation artist Richard Prince steadfastly refused to say what his reworkings
of another artist’s photographs were about. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Prince testified that he has no interest in the original meaning of the photographs he uses. Prince testified that he doesn’t ‘really have a message’ he attempts to
communicate when making art.”) (citation omitted).
235
In this way, my account of authorship differs from Abraham Drassinower’s. For him,
authorship is “a communicative act.” Drassinower, supra note 5, at 8.
236
Writing about photography and the visual arts, Judge Kaplan explained, “[I]t is not
clear that there is any real distinction between the idea in a work of art and its expression. An
artist’s idea, among other things, is to depict a particular subject in a particular way.”
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2016]

A Theory of Copyright Authorship

1271

them.237 They do, however, produce a variety of feelings and emotions,
and they can lead to the generation of other thoughts and meanings.238
Although only certain kinds of authorship are intended to express ideas, all authorship is intended to produce mental effects. The production
of mental effects at the heart of my account of authorship incorporates
the expression of ideas and the communication of semantic content, but
it also recognizes the aspects of works that generate feelings and emotions. The expression of ideas is merely a subset of the ways in which
copyrightable authorship produces mental effects. Thus, my approach
rejects the traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion while preserving at least some aspects of the dichotomy between the mind and the
rest of world.239
In so doing, my theory recognizes a much broader array of ways in
which a person can engage in authorship and of the kinds of objects that
can count as “Writings.” Other accounts of authorship limit authorial activity to visual and auditory creations. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, the Supreme Court explained that constitutional “writings”
“include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c. [sic], by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression.”240 The D.C. Circuit upheld the rejection of the copyrightability of
the “feel” of a Koosh Ball, because it determined that the tactile sensation was functional.241 And Pamela Samuelson has argued that objects
237

Judge Learned Hand appreciated this:
There has of late been prose written, avowedly senseless, but designed by its sound
alone to produce an emotion. Conceivably there may arise a poet who strings together
words without rational sequence—perhaps even coined syllables—through whose
beauty, cadence, meter, and rhyme he may seek to make poetry. Music is not normally
a representative art, yet it is a “writing.”
Reiss v. Nat’l Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
238
Darren Hudson Hick recognizes that ideas do not necessarily include semantic content
nor do they deny emotional content. He writes:
If we take an idea to be, roughly, the content of a thought, feeling, emotion, desire,
and/or other cognitive state or event, and an expression to be the manifestation or embodiment of such an idea or ideas in a perceptible form, then ‘expression’ will always
be an ellipsis for “expression-of-an-idea” or “expression-of-ideas.”
Hick, Appropriation, supra note 165, at 1183. If the idea/expression dichotomy is so understood, then it presents no logical problem.
239
See Damasio, supra note 208, at 250.
240
111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
241
See OddzOn Prods. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Copyright Office did not abuse its discretion in refusing to register a copyright for the Koosh
Ball where the Copyright Office examiners refused to consider the feel of the ball as a basis
for registration on the grounds that the feel was “a functional part of the work”).
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can only be authors’ writings if they “portray appearances—visible or
audible—or convey information.”242 But no reason is ever given for distinguishing between ideas or information conveyed visually and ideas
and information conveyed tactilely, gustatorily, or aromatically.
In a prior article, I explained the ways in which these other senses are
similarly capable of conveying information as are sight and hearing.243
The same claim is clearly true for their ability to produce mental effects.
The flavors of a dish or the aromas of a perfume can just as richly produce feelings of joy, lust, or danger as can the notes of a concerto or the
images of a movie.244 An entire realm of “tactile art” has emerged that is
intended for the consumption of both unsighted and sighted people.245
No valid arguments can be offered for why these works are constitutionally incapable of serving as the writings of authors.
Accordingly, a writing is any fixed medium that produces mental effects in an audience. If a medium is capable of producing feelings, ideas,
thoughts, or emotions then it is constitutionally capable of serving as a
writing. As the Supreme Court observed in Goldstein v. California in
1973, “[A]lthough the word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or
printed material, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”246 Thus, a culinary dish, perfume, or tactile object can serve as a writing of an author
in the same way that a book, photograph, or dance can. Once again,
however, the extent of the copyright protection available for a work
fixed in any of these media will reach only to the aspects of it that constitute authorship, that is, those that create mental effects. The functional
aspects of a dish are no more copyrightable than are the functional aspects of a book.247
As discussed in greater detail below, just because a work entails some
degree of authorship does not mean that it must receive copyright pro242

Samuelson, supra note 141, at 733.
Buccafusco, Making Sense, supra note 3, at 537–41.
244
See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas
Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1121, 1156 (2007)
[hereinafter Buccafusco, Recipes].
245
Oliver Sacks, The Mind’s Eye: What the Blind See, in Empire of the Senses: The Sensual Culture Reader 25, 25–41 (David Howes ed., 2005) (describing the experiences of several blind persons and concluding that visual, auditory, intellectual, emotional, and linguistic
experiences are fused together in one’s mental landscape, rather than being separate).
246
412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
247
Functional, in this context, refers to the effects of the dish on nonmental factors, such as
its caloric content or its nutritional benefits.
243

COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2016]

A Theory of Copyright Authorship

1273

tection.248 Congress need not use the power the Constitution has given it
to extend protection to all categories of works. In addition, just because
Congress has extended protection to a given category of works, it need
not extend protection to all works in the category. For example, Congress provides protection for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, but
it screens out some of these under the “useful articles” doctrine, because
it deems them excessively functional.249 This it may continue to do under my approach as well.
3. The Work as Manner or Form
Authoring a writing is an act of intending to produce mental effects in
an audience through the fixed, original, and creative selection of elements capable of producing those effects.250 Copyright subsists, then, in
the manner by which the elements are selected and the form that they
take. Depending on the medium, this involves the arrangement of
shapes, colors, notes, words, images, tastes, smells, or tactile sensations.
It is the painter’s selection of colors and shapes; the author’s choice of
genre, syntax, and diction; or the chef’s arrangement of meats, vegetables, and sauces that constitutes the copyrightable “work.”251
As described above, copyright law must exclude functional aspects of
a work from protection.252 It also excludes the foundational building

248

See infra Section III.B.
See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 707, 741–42 (1983).
250
My definition is similar to one proposed by Drassinower of a work of authorship. He
notes that “a work [of authorship] is not a thing, whether intangible or otherwise, but an act
whereby a person addresses others through speech.” Drassinower, supra note 5, at 8.
251
Although the work of authorship is composed of formal features and components, the
work does not arise simply from the formal elements alone. What makes something a work
of authorship is that it was created by a person with the intent that it produce mental effects
in an audience. The right in the work, however, extends to the combination of formal elements by which the author intended to produce those effects. In this sense, my approach is
not “formalist” as that term is used in aesthetic theory. See Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation 13 (July 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstra
ct=2472500 [https://perma.cc/PHH6-6J8Z]. Said writes, “Formalism refers to an interpretive
method that emphasizes as the source of interpretive meaning the work itself (really, the
form of the work, hence the method’s name). Works are interpretively ‘free-standing, selfsubsistent objects’ whose analysis can be objective, correct, and devoid of evidence from
outside the text.” Id. (footnote omitted).
252
The mechanisms by which copyright excludes functionality are discussed infra Section
III.B.
249
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blocks of works of authorship, the formal elements of creativity.253 This
principle preserves from exclusive control elements, ideas, and concepts
that are deemed essential to authorship.254 In the same way that the
idea/expression dichotomy excludes from copyright those things it calls
ideas, my theory excludes mental effects from copyright protection. The
mental effects produced by works of authorship are not copyrightable
and for the same reason often given for why “ideas” are not copyrightable.255 Allowing people to have exclusive control over the production of
particular mental effects would be terrible for creativity and social welfare. This point is so obvious that it needs little argument. Limiting access to mental effects, including to thoughts, ideas, and emotions, would
severely impair downstream creators, and it would produce significant
costs for the consuming public that would be unrelated to any incentive
gain. Mental effects themselves remain in the public domain.
The copyrightable aspect of a work of authorship, then, exists in the
manner by which it produces mental effects. All works of authorship are
created from uncopyrightable component parts or formal elements—
colors, notes, words, shapes, chemicals, and other substances. Authors
select among these parts and combine them to produce mental effects.
Conceived of in this fashion, all works of authorship are like the compilations at issue in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,256 the bringing together of otherwise uncopyrightable elements in a
copyrightable way. And, as in Feist, the copyright attaches to the manner by which the creator selects, coordinates, and arranges to produce
mental effects. It is the creator’s choice about how to produce a given
mental effect that receives copyright protection. These choices are embodied in the formal arrangement of work, and it is to the form that the
copyright attaches.
The Court’s opinion in Feist notes, in the context of originality, that
only some selections, coordinations, and arrangements of facts will trig253

Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–48 (1991).
See Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (“If an author, by originating a
new arrangement and form of expression of certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw
these ideas or conceptions from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each copyright would narrow the field of thought open for development and exploitation, and science,
poetry, narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches of literature would be hindered by
copyright, instead of being promoted.”).
255
The notion, sometimes asserted, that ideas are not original to an author seems blatantly
incorrect, at least if originality in the copyright context means only not copied.
256
499 U.S. 340.
254
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ger copyright protection—that is, those that are done “in such a way”
that they are original and minimally creative.257 Similarly, in the context
of authorship itself, only some selections, coordinations, and arrangements of components will trigger protection—that is, those that are done
“in such a way” as to produce mental effects. Again, choices directed
towards other considerations are not copyrightable authorship.258
C. Authorship, Originality, and Creativity
With this conception of authorship in mind, we can get a clearer sense
of the elements of copyrightable subject matter and their relationship to
one another. As described above, the Supreme Court in Feist clarified
that in order to be copyrightable, a work has to be original.259 It further
broke down originality into two separate concepts. The work could not
be copied from another source, and it had to be at least minimally creative.260 Although the Court did little to clarify what it meant by creativity,261 it seemed to require some degree of cleverness or nonobviousness.262 For purposes of this Article, I prefer to treat these two concepts
as separate elements called “originality” (that is, not copied) and creativity.263 In addition to these two elements, the Court has declared fixation
to be a third constitutional requirement.
257

Id. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In my approach, then, the idea/expression dichotomy is instead the effect/manner dichotomy.
259
499 U.S. at 345.
260
Id.
261
Bridy, supra note 19, at 8 (“Copyright scholars have been nearly uniformly critical of
the Court’s failure in Feist to give any real content to the creativity requirement.”); VerSteeg, supra note 112, at 4 (“Although the opinion established a rule that requires ‘creativity’
as an element required for originality (and hence copyrightability), Feist does not define
‘creativity.’”).
262
The Court distinguishes creative works from those that are “crude, humble, or obvious.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra note 181, § 1.08[C][1]); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d
674, 682 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Thus, when it comes to the selection or arrangement of information, creativity inheres in making non-obvious choices from among more than a few options.”).
263
Courts and scholars use this bifurcating approach. According to the Seventh Circuit,
“Although the requirements of independent creation and intellectual labor both flow from the
constitutional prerequisite of authorship and the statutory reference to original works of authorship, courts often engender confusion by referring to both concepts by the term ‘originality.’” Balt. Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 n.6 (7th Cir.
1986). David Nimmer seems to prefer this separation as well: “‘[O]riginality’ means that the
work derives from the copyright owner, as opposed to that individual having copied it from a
258
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To these elements my theory adds a fourth—authorship. In order to
be copyrightable a given work must be (1) original (independently created), (2) creative (at least minimally clever), (3) fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and (4) authored (created with intention of producing
mental effects). Authorship stands out as a separate element of a work
that makes it subject to the constitutional grant of powers in Article I. It
asks a different question from those addressed by the Court in Feist. The
authorship element further inquires into whether those choices were
made with the intention of producing mental effects in an audience.
Consider how the different elements work together. Someone might
be an author but not have produced a writing if the work that she created
was not fixed, for example by whistling a new tune. The resulting work
would not be constitutionally copyrightable until it was fixed by or under the authority of the author.264 In addition, there might be writings
without authors. Photographs taken by monkeys or images of the Virgin
Mary on toast might produce mental effects in an audience, but they
were not created by people who intended that they do so. Only those
creations which embody the act of authorship can receive copyright protection.
This reading of the Constitution is consistent with the language Congress used in the 1976 Act. According to Section 102(a), “copyright
subsists in original works of authorship.”265 As Michael Madison has
pointed out, this construction, with the modifier “original,” implies that
there could be nonoriginal works of authorship.266 Similarly, the construction implies that there might be original things that are not works of
authorship. Something might not be copied from another source and it
previous source, while ‘creativity’ refers to a spark above the level of the banal.” Nimmer,
supra note 3, at 14–15.
264
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”).
265
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
266
Michael J. Madison, IP Things as Boundary Objects: The Case of the Copyright Work
9 (U. Pitt. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2013-12,
2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256255 [https://perma.cc/FS62-YMLQ] (“Some works of
authorship are not original, both according to the logic of the statute (one might have a ‘work
of authorship’ not prefaced by the word ‘original’) and according to the Supreme Court in
Feist[.]”); see also Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1262
(10th Cir. 2008) (“[N]ot every work of authorship, let alone every aspect of every work of
authorship, is protectable in copyright; only original expressions are protected.”).
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might evince substantial creativity, but it still might lack the features of
authorship.
In the 1976 Act, Section 102(b) has been asked to play the role of
gatekeeper of authorship. It declares: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”267 Some authors treat this as a “negative” element—as a limitation or clawback on the scope of copyrightable subject
matter.268 It is better seen, in my view, as an implicit recognition of the
authorship requirement. Procedures, processes, systems, and methods of
operation are not copyrightable because they are not authorship. Or, to
be more precise, they are not copyrightable to the extent that they are not
authorship. A given creation is a potentially copyrightable work of authorship, rather than an uncopyrightable process, to the extent that it
produces mental effects in an audience. To put it obversely, a “process”
or “method” that produces mental effects in an audience is potentially
copyrightable to the extent that it does so; if it does not, however, it is
not copyrightable. In this sense, Section 102(b) is no more essential than
the word “original” in Section 102(a)—the Constitution itself demands
that unauthored and unoriginal creations cannot receive copyright. The
implications of this approach are explored in Section III.B.
III. APPLYING THE THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP
A valuable theory of authorship should be able to successfully resolve
important issues in copyright law. Such a theory need not, however,
make all legal questions simple, and this theory does not do so. The theory of authorship as categorial intentions to create mental effects provides a coherent and workable approach to understanding the contours
of copyrightable authorship at two separate levels. First, it explains the
extent of Congress’s Article I power to grant copyright to certain sorts of
people (“Authors”) and to certain categories of works (“Writings”). Second, for any particular work, my theory helps determine which aspects
of the work are potentially copyrightable. All works contain copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements; my theory provides a useful test for
differentiating them. Nonetheless, difficult questions—both factual and
267
268

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
Cohen et al., supra note 99, at 47.
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empirical—remain, as they will with any attempt to comprehend the nature of copyright law.
A. Constitutional Writings
Just as the Constitution limits Congress’s power to grant copyrights
only to “Authors,” it also limits Congress’s power to grant copyrights
solely for “Writings.” If a given thing is not a writing, it cannot be a
copyrighted work of authorship. As alluded to in Section II.B above, my
theory establishes a broad range of media that are capable of instantiating writings. Any object, text, or medium that is capable of producing
mental effects in an audience can serve as a writing.269 Moreover, since
mental effects can be produced in a variety of different ways and
through each of the human senses, the range of constitutional writings
extends to any method of generating those effects for any of the senses.270
My theory provides a much broader and more inclusive sense of writings than has been previously recognized.271 According to my approach,
virtually any object is capable of embodying authorship and serving as a
writing. This is a benefit of the theory, not a limitation. Human creativity is vast and constantly evolving.272 People communicate with one another in a multitude of different forms, and technological developments
are providing an ever-expanding range of new media.273 Any approach
to authorship that categorically excludes these techniques or that limits
269

As noted above, the “Writings” requirement of the Constitution demands that works of
authorship be fixed in a tangible medium of expression. The remainder of this Section assumes that this is the case for all examples discussed.
270
See Buccafusco, Making Sense, supra note 3, at 508.
271
See supra notes 240–47 & accompanying text. For example, Drassinower’s theory of
authorship would presumably exclude cuisine and perfumes from the realm of copyrightability. See Drassinower, supra note 5235, at 90–91, 238 n.9.
272
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664
(“Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to
foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take.”).
273
See, e.g., Matthew J. Hertenstein et al., Touch Communicates Distinct Emotions, 6
Emotion 528, 528 (2006); Mark Paterson, Haptic Geographies: Ethnography, Haptic Knowledges and Sensuous Dispositions, 33 Progress in Hum. Geography 766, 766 (2009); see also
David Howes, Sensual Relations: Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social Theory, at xii
(2003) (“In the last few decades there has occurred a remarkable florescence of theoretically
engaged (and engaging) work on the senses in a wide range of disciplines: from history and
philosophy to geography and sociology, and from law and medicine to literature and art
criticism.”).
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authorship to those that are currently popular or economically valuable
ignores enormous swathes of creativity, communication, and interaction.274
The variety of potentially copyrightable works of authorship is truly
enormous. When pyrotechnic designers create fireworks displays, they
are intentionally creating a series of mental effects for an audience, so
the fireworks program is potentially copyrightable. Although the particular bursts of light may be too fleeting to satisfy the fixation requirement, designers can describe the series of fireworks, including their order and timing, along with any musical or performative accompaniment,
to make them sufficiently fixed. The same is true for chefs creating new
dishes or perfume designers generating new scents. The underlying ingredients of these works are not copyrightable—whether foie gras, asparagus, or isobornyl cyclohexanol275—but combinations of them are, if
they are combined in ways that are original, minimally creative, and intended to create mental effects. Again, notation in the form of recipes or
cocktails specifying the ingredients to be used and the manner of their
combination will satisfy the fixation requirement. These recipes are no
different from musical or dance notations that instruct people about how
to perform those works.276
In a recent case, Kelley v. Chicago Park District, the Seventh Circuit
rejected a copyright lawsuit by the creator of a public flower garden on
the ground that “a living garden lacks the kind of authorship . . . normally required to support copyright.”277 The court asserted
that “gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored.”278 It continued:
Most of what we see and experience in a garden—the colors, shapes,
textures, and scents of the plants—originates in nature, not in the mind
of the gardener. . . . To the extent that seeds or seedlings can be considered a “medium of expression,” they originate in nature, and natural forces—not the intellect of the gardener—determine their form,
growth, and appearance.279

274

See Buccafusco, Making Sense, supra note 3, at 501, 536–37.
A chemical with an aroma similar to sandalwood.
276
Buccafusco, Recipes, supra note 244, at 1131, 1133.
277
635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011).
278
Id. at 304.
279
Id.
275
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Surprisingly, the court makes no attempt to distinguish the efforts of a
gardener in carefully selecting and arranging a variety of different elements with the goal of creating an experience from those of someone
who photographs the garden or someone who sets up an audio recording
device to capture the sounds in the garden. Both of the latter people
would be considered authors.280 The gardener may not be able to fully
anticipate every form the work may take during its existence, but that is
equally true of someone who paints a mural on the outside of a building.
The gardener in Kelley, like all other copyright authors, created, selected, and arranged various elements in such a way that they would produce mental effects in an audience. Nothing more is needed to call him
an author.281
At this point, an important qualification is necessary. In the previous
discussion, I have argued that all of these creations—recipes, perfumes,
and gardens—are potentially copyrightable and not that they are copyrightable per se. This is because Congress need not and should not utilize its full constitutional power in establishing copyright protection for
all writings of authors.282 The constitutional grant of powers produces a
limit on the extent of the powers that have been granted. The terms
“Writings” and “Authors” establish a constitutional outer bound for
congressional action. But, since the first Copyright Act of 1790, Congress has chosen not to utilize its full power.
The 1790 Act granted copyright protection only to “maps, Charts,
And books.”283 Most recently, the 1976 Act extended protection to sev280

Photographs and sound recordings are both copyrightable subject matter under 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). It is possible that the photograph or sound recording would fail on
other copyright grounds. See, e.g., Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Imps., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
1053 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that photographs of bowls of food were insufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection).
281
The court was also concerned that the garden failed to meet the fixation requirement
established in the statute. 635 F.3d at 304–05 (“[A] garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the primary purpose of fixation; its appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline for determining questions of copyright creation and infringement.”). Again, I am skeptical that there is insufficient permanence in the garden to satisfy the fixation requirement.
One would like to know if other gardeners, having seen the plaintiff’s plans or photos of the
garden, would understand what it would look like at various times throughout the year and
over time. Just because works are subject to changes does not mean that they are not sufficiently fixed for copyright purposes if the changes can be anticipated.
282
See Reese, supra note 37, at 1521–22.
283
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).

COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2016]

A Theory of Copyright Authorship

1281

en, and then eight, categories of “original works of authorship.”284 The
House report on the Act notes that this term was chosen “to avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this
field.”285 Accordingly, not every writing of an author will receive copyright protection (see Figure 1 above). There will be some creations that
qualify constitutionally as authored writings but that are not within the
scope of the current statutory scheme.286 These works, unless protected
by state laws, are in the public domain and are free to use. The garden at
issue in Kelley may fall into this category if it does not qualify as a “pictorial, graphic, [or] sculptural work[]” under Section 102.287 That is, it
would fall inside of the large circle but outside of the small circle in Figure 1.
This is as it should be.288 Copyright law exists to solve a particular
economic problem—optimizing creative production through the balanced provision of incentives.289 But these incentives are costly and
should only be applied when necessary to generate public goods. Some
creative fields may exist and even thrive despite having little or no copyright protection. A large and growing body of scholarship has described
intellectual property law’s negative spaces,290 such as fashion,291

284

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)).
285
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. The
1909 Act had extended copyright protection to “all the writings of an author,” and courts had
struggled to interpret the scope of this language. See discussion supra note 39.
286
See Reese, supra note 37, at 1521.
287
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 299 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)).
288
Reese, supra note 37, at 1521. (“[B]ecause Congress should affirmatively decide which
subject matter it wishes to protect by copyright, and should protect only that subject matter,
Congress should not take the route of simply granting protection to all of the subject matter
that the Constitution would empower it to protect.”).
289
Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright Infringement, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 2433 (2016).
290
See generally Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy: How
Imitation Sparks Innovation (2012) (examining whether creativity can coexist with copying).
291
See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687, 1722 (2006) (arguing that fashion
progresses more rapidly through copying than it would without it).
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cooking,292 magic,293 and stand-up comedy,294 where creativity abounds
even in the absence of formal legal rights.295 Because of informal norms
or specific aspects of markets or creative production, these fields are not
currently subject to pressures from copying that substantially undermine
creators’ efforts.296 So where copyright protection cannot be shown to be
a good, its anticompetitive effects are an evil that should be avoided.
Just because copyright protection is not currently necessary for a
number of creative fields does not mean that it never will be. Markets
can change, and technologies can produce new pressures on creators.
Throughout much of copyright history, the performers of musical works
were not given separate copyrights in their performances, in part because performances were technologically difficult to copy.297 This
changed in the second half of the twentieth century, as handheld recording devices became cheaply available. Congress responded by extending
copyright to sound recordings in 1972.298 Similarly, chefs do not currently require copyright protection to ensure a steady stream of income
from their creative efforts. Copying elite cuisine is incredibly difficult
for home cooks, and informal social norms limit copying among professionals. The economic situation could change, however, if consumers
could purchase 3D culinary printers capable of cheaply recreating dishes
from their favorite restaurants at home. My approach, which recognizes
292
See Buccafusco, Recipes, supra note 244, at 1150; Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von
Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 Org. Sci.
187, 187–88 (2008).
293
Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without
Law 26 (July 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005564
[https://perma.cc/33LW-3S5L].
294
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 Va. L.
Rev. 1787, 1790 (2008).
295
See, e.g., David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1093, 1093, 1096–97 (2012); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 511, 532, 539 (2013); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt,
Intellectual Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 441,
460–61 (2013).
296
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 290, at 39, 78, 105.
297
See Barbara A. Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings (Study No.
26), in Staff of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Copyright Law Revision: Studies
Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, Studies 26–28, at 1, 2–8, 21–37 (Comm. Print 1961).
298
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 391; H.R. Rep. No. 92-487
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N 1566.
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dishes and other creative works as copyrightable but not currently protected works of authorship,299 gives Congress the flexibility to provide
or withhold copyright protection when appropriate.
B. Copyrightable Aspects of Works
Although many categories of works fall within the statutory protection scheme, not all aspects of these works are copyrightable.300 Copyright law employs a variety of doctrines to exclude from ownership certain aspects of a work. Only those aspects of a work that are
independently created, more than minimally creative, and in a fixed
form are eligible for protection.301 Copyright law also uses various
mechanisms to screen out functional components of a work. My theory
adds to these the requirement that only those aspects of a work that constitute authorship (that is, that were intended to produce mental effects)
are eligible for protection.
In this sense, authorship serves as a claiming mechanism in copyright
law.302 Because copyright cannot extend to any aspect of a work that
does not constitute authorship, the authorship inquiry delimits the scope
of copyright protection. When an author has produced a work, she can
only claim copyright in the aspects of that work that entail original, creative, and fixed authorship. This approach to copyright claiming is much
easier and more valid than those that have been applied in the past.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. clarified that
the copyrightable aspects of works had to be original and more than trivially creative.303 It said nothing more about the aspects of works that
could qualify for copyright. This has been left to Section 102(b)’s limitations on ideas, methods, and processes.304 Figuring out which elements
299

The distinction here is similar to the one made by Frederick Schauer between “covered” speech and “protected” speech. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 1769.
300
Reese, supra note 37, at 1491 (“Not everything within copyright’s subject matter will
actually be protected by copyright, of course. Under the current statute, while copyright protects ‘works of authorship,’ not every work of authorship qualifies—only works that are both
original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression can actually obtain copyright.”).
301
Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 355 (1991).
302
See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719
(2009) (discussing the different claiming mechanisms for copyright and patent); Mark A.
Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, The Scope of IP Rights, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2660951 [https://perma.cc/RE6E-VP5H] (discussing the scope of protection offered to authors).
303
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
304
See supra text accompanying note 267.
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of works fail under Section 102(b) has proved deeply challenging.305
Distinguishing ideas from expression has proved so hopelessly difficult
in the visual arts that one federal judge has given up the attempt.306 In
addition, what looks like a method to one court appears to be a taxonomy to another.307 Dance notation, culinary recipes, accounting techniques, and computer software are all lists of instructions for how to do
things. They are all “methods.” What makes some of them copyrightable
and others not? Section 102(b) cannot tell us. The answer is that some of
them produce mental effects or are ways of fixing works that produce
mental effects.
The authorship inquiry examines the claimant’s categorial intentions
for what she has produced. It considers the choices that she made to
combine elements in certain ways, and it asks why she made them. It is
not sufficient that she or another person could have made other choices.
She must have made them for a specific reason—to produce mental effects in an audience. By asking this question, we obviate the need for
further analysis of expression, ideas, systems, processes, and methods.
Importantly, however, this does not mean that all authorial aspects of
a work or all protectable works will end up receiving copyright protection. In certain cases, copyright law screens out certain, otherwise protectable, works due to concerns about excessive functionality. The principle example of where this functionality screening occurs is for
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” (“PGS”) works.308 To the extent that
a PGS work constitutes a “useful article,” it may be deemed too functional to merit protection.309 Although the work in question may incorporate copyrightable authorship, the useful articles doctrine prevents the
work from obtaining protection even for these parts. Accordingly, a bi305

See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We conclude
that although an element of a work may be characterized as a method of operation, that element may nevertheless contain expression that is eligible for copyright protection.”).
306
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“For all of
these reasons, I think little is gained by attempting to distinguish an unprotectible ‘idea’ from
its protectible ‘expression’ in a photograph or other work of visual art.”).
307
See supra text accompanying notes 126–40.
308
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Recently, the Ninth Circuit applied a version of this sort of
functionality screening to a series of yoga poses, ruling that although the series was “beautiful,” it “remains unprotectable as a process the design of which primarily reflects function,
not expression.” Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032,
1040 (9th Cir. 2015).
309
Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148–49 (2d Cir. 1987);
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422–23 (2d Cir. 1985).
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cycle rack that incorporates both copyrightable expression and unprotectable function might be denied copyright because its design was excessively motivated by functional considerations.310
Nothing in my authorship theory affects the useful articles doctrine or
other efforts by Congress to screen out certain kinds of works from copyright. Just as Congress need not offer copyright protection to all classes
of authorial works,311 it need not offer copyright protection to all instances of authorship within an otherwise protected class of works. That
is, in the same way that Congress may choose not to extend copyright
protection to culinary dishes, it may also decide that, having extended
protection to some PGS works, it need not extend protection to all of
them.
Other than for PGS works, Congress has not generally used this sort
of functionality threshold for determining copyrightability. For other
classes of works, including literary works such as computer code, the
law attempts to screen functionality incrementally. Copyright extends to
all expressive aspects of such works, once the functional portions have
been screened out. My theory makes this task easier. Rather than screening out aspects of a work that are “functional” or that count as ideas,
systems, or processes, my theory only allows in aspects of a work that
constitute authorship in the first place. The following subsections illustrate this analysis.
1. Traditional Creative Works
Understanding the copyrightability of works of visual art has consistently proved befuddling for courts.312 This has been especially true for
photography.313 Since the nineteenth-century case Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, courts have struggled to understand the nature of
copyrightable authorship in a photograph.314 In large part, the
idea/expression dichotomy has been to blame.315
310

Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1148–49.
See supra Section III.A.
312
Judge Kaplan catalogs many of these difficulties in his opinion in Mannion v. Coors
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
313
See Farley, supra note 69.
314
See id.; Tushnet, supra note 74, at 715; see also Zahr Kassim Said, Only Part of the Picture: A Response to Professor Tushnet’s Worth a Thousand Words, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
349 (2013) (arguing that many of the problems Tushnet finds in visual art jurisprudence appear in other areas as well).
315
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
311
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Judge Kaplan, in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., attempts to explain
the nature of photographic copyrights—in this case, of a posed photograph of basketball star Kevin Garnett dressed in “bling bling.”316 The
defendant produced a similar image and denied infringement on the
ground that copyright law conveys no rights over the subject matter of
the photograph, because a photo’s subject is an unprotectable “idea.”317
Wisely, Judge Kaplan eschews the idea/expression dichotomy as unworkable for the same reasons that I articulated above.318 Instead, he
asks a different question: How can photographs be “original”?319 He lists
three ways. A photograph can be original in its rendition (how the photographer depicts a subject), in its timing (that the photographer was in
the right place at the right time), and in the creation of its subject (the
bringing together of different objects in the world).320 In this case, because the photographer instructed Garnett to wear certain clothes and to
stand in a certain way (he told him to look “chilled out”), the image embodied original creation of a subject that the defendant was prohibited
from copying.321 In this sense, the copyright protects not just how the
subject was depicted but what was depicted.
While Judge Kaplan’s rejection of the idea/expression dichotomy is
laudatory, his approach to originality is potentially problematic and
needlessly complex. Copyright law never protects objects or things in
the world. It protects relationships between them. Copyright law always
protects only the manner or form in which uncopyrightable elements are
brought together via selection, coordination, and arrangement by an author, and fixed in a tangible medium. Authorship is an act—of expressing, representing, or arranging—and it is the act that is potentially copyrightable. In this sense, the only way that photographs are copyrightable
is through what Judge Kaplan called “rendition”—how something is depicted, not what is depicted.322 Moreover, this is the only way in which
any work is copyrightable.
Accordingly, we need to inquire into the manner in which the uncopyrightable elements of the photograph are composed. We need to
316

Id. at 447.
Id. at 450 (citing Caratzas v. Time Life, No. 92 Civ. 6346 (PKL), 1992 WL 322033, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992)).
318
Id. at 459. See supra notes 221–39 and accompanying text.
319
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
320
Id. at 452–54.
321
Id. at 454–55.
322
Id. at 452.
317
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understand the relationship that the photographer created between the
objects in the image (Garnett, his clothes, the sky, etc.) and how they
were depicted (from what angle, in what light, etc.).323 This, and no
more, is the extent of the photographer’s authorship. Having determined
the scope of the photographer’s authorship, we would next apply copyright law’s other criteria, the requirements of originality and minimal
creativity.324 Only those aspects of authorship that are also not copied
and sufficiently creative obtain protection. Although few if any individual aspects of a photograph will be original, we can ask whether the “total concept and feel” of these relationships, arrangements, and depictions
is original and creative.325
The proposed analysis considers the relationship between creators’
categorial intentions to create mental effects and the choices they made
to do so. At the inquiry’s initial stage, where the court determines the
metes and bounds of the copyrighted work, creators’ semantic intentions—what they tried to express, represent, or produce—are irrelevant.
Semantic intentions only matter, if they do, when the court is asked to
consider whether the defendant’s work infringes the plaintiff’s work.326
2. Systems, Processes, and Taxonomies
The same sort of inquiry applies to cases dealing with codes and directories for arranging and systematizing information such as Feist and
323

We must also exclude from analysis any aspects of the work that were not produced
with the intention of creating mental effects. For example, if the image was printed on a certain kind of paper to make it function as a billboard, this aspect of the work would not constitute authorship.
324
I am assuming that the photograph is sufficiently fixed in a tangible medium.
325
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (articulating the “total concept and feel” test). The “total concept and feel” test has been criticized
by Rebecca Tushnet, among others, both for its underlying logic and its practical effects.
Tushnet, supra note 74, at 733–38. These are important criticisms, but ultimately I believe
that some form of “intrinsic” analysis of copyright works is inevitable. Creative authorship
involves the selection and combination of unprotectable elements into a potentially protectable whole. Only by contemplating the ways in which these elements are brought together can
we appreciate the actual creative work that may have been done.
326
Semantic intentions may matter, for example, for determining whether the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s works are too similar to one another or whether the defendant’s work should
be considered a fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining fair use). Whether or not semantic intentions matter, though, depends on the infringement standard the court applies. In
Tushnet’s suggested solution, where all that matters for infringement of the reproduction
right is exact copying, even semantic intentions may not matter. See Tushnet, supra note 74,
at 739–40.
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American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n. A judge hearing
these cases should first ask whether the plaintiff engaged in any authorship. The judge should consider the decisions that the plaintiff made and
inquire into why it made them. In the selection, coordination, and arrangement of elements, did it intend to produce any mental effect on an
audience? In Feist, the names, addresses, and phone numbers were selected to create a mental effect—conveying information about these
facts.327 But since these elements themselves were not original to the author, Rural Telephone Company, the plaintiff could not obtain a copyright in them.328 Rural instead claimed that the way it selected, coordinated, and arranged the names and information was copyrightable.329 So
we should consider why it arranged the names in the manner that it
did—alphabetically by last name. The answer, of course, is convenience
and efficiency. A white pages directory is arranged alphabetically in order to ease its use. Rural was not attempting to express anything about
the relationship between different names or addresses.330 It was not trying to produce particular feelings in readers of the text by the manner in
which it organized the names and numbers. Accordingly, Rural’s coordination and arrangement of facts was not authorship. The Court never
even had to determine whether they were also original and creative.331
In Feist, we can see the benefits of my authorship theory as well as
the limitations of the authorship-as-choice approach.332 Rural could have
chosen any number of ways in which it coordinated and arranged facts.
It could have arranged them alphabetically by first name, numerically by
phone number, or randomly. The number of available options is limit-

327

Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 361–62.
329
Id. at 362.
330
Rural was certainly conveying information by way of reproducing facts, but it was not
trying to convey information by way of its particular arrangement of those facts.
331
See also Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the random or arbitrary assignment of parts numbers was insufficiently original to establish copyright). Instead, the court should have held in Toro that the assignment of parts numbers was not authorship—it was not intended to convey any particular information about the
relationship between the different parts. This is not to suggest, however, that randomness is
always a bar to copyrightability. If an author intentionally incorporates randomness into her
creation for purposes of communicating something about the randomness, for example, that
would clear the authorship bar. See Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and
Indeterminacy, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 569 (2002).
332
See supra text accompanying notes 129–36.
328
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less. Only by considering why Rural made the choices that it did can we
see that those choices are not constitutive of authorship.
Now consider American Dental Ass’n. We begin by asking what the
ADA did and why it did it. The ADA coordinated and arranged dental
procedures, and it assigned code numbers to these procedures based on
their arrangement. It would be helpful to know more about why the
ADA made these decisions, though. Did the ADA place two procedures
next to each other in its system to make the system easier to use (for example, because dentists looking up the first procedure often look up the
second procedure)? If so, its arrangement would not constitute authorship. Instead, if the ADA placed procedures in the same category in order to convey information about the relationship to one another, then
their decision would amount to authorship.333 This is the taxonomic
function that Judge Easterbrook noted, but it is not a “function” in a way
that disqualifies it for copyrightability.334 The same inquiry into intentions is appropriate for the code numbers that were assigned to the procedures. Were they assigned arbitrarily or were they intended to convey
information about the procedures? Only if the court determines that the
arrangement of procedures or the assignment of code numbers constituted authorship should it proceed to determine whether the manner of the
arrangement or the manner of assigning code numbers were not copied
and more than minimally creative.335
My approach suggests that while the Seventh Circuit may have been
correct in American Dental Ass’n, the Third Circuit was incorrect in a
similar case involving parts numbering. In Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge
Corp., the Third Circuit incorrectly determined that parts numbers were
functional.336 It wrote: “The Southco numbers are purely functional; . . . .
[They] convey information about a few objective characteristics of
mundane products—for example, that a particular screw is one-eighth of
333
Conveying information is not sufficient to qualify as authorship. Authorship involves
the manner or form in which the information is conveyed. The author must select and arrange the information “in such a way” that it is original and creative for authorship to arise.
See supra notes 250–58.
334
One of the key benefits of my approach is that it looks not to definition and names but
rather to effects. It does not ask whether something is a process or an idea or an expression
but rather, it asks: How does the thing do its work?
335
The approach taken here is relevant to questions about the copyrightability of games as
well. See Bruce E. Boyden, Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 439, 477 (2011).
336
390 F.3d 276, 284, 299 (3d Cir.2004).
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an inch in length.”337 Conveying information, however, is not a function
in the copyright sense. It is authorship in that it produces a mental effect.
Of course, the manner by which that information was conveyed may not
have been original or more than trivially creative.
3. Computer Software
Understanding copyrightable authorship as the manner by which
mental effects are produced also makes analyzing cases involving computer software substantially easier. Consider a simple example. A programmer writes a string of computer code that instructs a computer to
produce a visual display, for example, a video game character. The programmer would obtain a copyright in the visual image of the character if
the character is original and more than minimally creative. It is a pictorial or graphic work338 that is clearly intended to produce mental effects.
That the work was “fixed” in computer code rather than on paper is irrelevant. Either method of fixing the work produces a “copy” of the
work that others are prevented from duplicating.339 The same result
would hold if the creator provided detailed textual instructions for drawing the character.340
But what about the code used to create the visual image? Can the
code be a copyrightable work in its own right, or is it simply a copy of
the work that it fixes? Do the specific lines of code or anything else
about them evince copyrightable authorship? It depends on why those
lines of code were chosen. The judge should consider whether the manner in which the programmer selected and arranged the various elements
of the code—the letters, numbers, units, and modules—was done with
the intention of creating mental effects in an audience. The judge should
ask whether the elements were arranged in such a way that the programmer intended that a human reader would experience some particular thoughts, feelings, or emotions. If not, then the lines of code are not
337

Id. at 284.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (listing the categories of copyrightable subject matter).
339
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “[c]opies” as “material objects, other than
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term ‘copies’ includes the material object,
other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”).
340
Here, the “work” is the character, and the various descriptions of it are “copies.” Hick
helpfully refers to this relationship as one between types and tokens. Hick, Ontology, supra
note 171, at 188.
338
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copyrightable authorship. They are, instead, merely the method of fixing
copyright authorship (of the character) and are not copyrightable in
themselves. Further, it is not sufficient that a person is capable of “reading” the code to understand what instructions it is conveying to the computer. Being able to follow along the instructions for the production of
an outcome is not the same thing as producing mental effects by the
manner in which those instructions are drafted.341
To understand the relationship between software and authorship, consider an analogy to a culinary dish and its recipe. The culinary dish, like
the video game character, is a potentially copyrightable work of authorship if it is original, more than trivially creative, and fixed. Just as the
character is intended to create mental effects, so too the combination of
flavors, colors, textures, and aromas of the dish is intended to create
mental effects. Both the video game character and the dish are capable
of being fixed in a number of ways, that is, in various kinds of copies.
Either could be depicted visually, and either could be described linguistically in terms of how to create it via computer code or a recipe, respectively. If the works (character and dish) are copyrightable, their creators
will have the exclusive right to produce copies of them.342
If, however, the underlying works are not copyrightable, the method
of fixing the work still may be copyrightable. That is, the “copy” may
itself be a “work of authorship” to the extent that it contains separate
copyrightable authorship from that which it fixes. For this to be the case,
there must be something about the ways in which the elements of the
code or the recipe were arranged that produce separate mental effects.
This is easiest to understand in the case of a recipe. The recipe may
read: “Make a mound of a cup of flour, and create a well in the center of
the mound. Add nine egg yolks to the well and combine the ingredients.” Foodie readers may immediately recognize this as the beginning
of a pasta recipe. But their ability to recognize it as such, even if the pasta dish is copyrightable, does not mean that the recipe itself is copyrightable. This is because we are discussing two different works composed of
341

This is what Samuelson and her co-authors mean by programs “behaving.” Samuelson
et al., Manifesto, supra note 147, at 2316. The behavior of the program is no more a work of
authorship than the information conveyed in a database. Authorship only inheres in the form
or manner in which the behavior or information is conveyed.
342
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies). This means that the authors would have the exclusive right to generate versions of the work, for example, by distributing copies of the recipe or of the source
code.
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separate elements. The dish is a work composed of starches, fats, and
proteins. The recipe is a copy of that work. The recipe may also be a
separate work composed of words and numbers. The dish is a work of
authorship if the manner by which the starches, fats, and proteins were
arranged creates mental effects. The recipe is a work of authorship if the
manner by which the words and numbers were arranged creates mental
effects. This might be the case if, for example, the author of a recipe for
smoked brisket used Texan idioms to compose the recipe.343 Those aspects of the recipe would be independently copyrightable authorship if
original and creative. If, however, the words and numbers were chosen
because they were the easiest to understand and follow, the recipe would
not constitute separate authorship.
The same rules apply to computer software. Software, according to
the Copyright Act, is a set of instructions to a computer to produce an
outcome.344 Like the recipe, the instructions can serve two roles—they
provide the method of fixation for the outcome and they may be independent copyrightable authorship. The outcome of a computer program
is copyrightable authorship if it is intended to produce mental effects
and is original and more than trivially creative. If the outcome of the
program is an audio-visual display, then it is probably copyrightable authorship.345 If the outcome of the program is a method for adding together two sets of numbers, then it is not copyrightable authorship.346
So, too, for the software code as such. If the manner by which the programmer arranged the elements of the code was intended to create mental effects analogous to the Texas lingo in the brisket recipe, then those
aspects of the program are independently copyrightable authorship if
they meet the other requirements.
Returning to Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,347 we can consider
how this theory of authorship would apply to Oracle’s API. The issue
was not whether the outcomes of the programs were copyrightable, but
whether the specific lines of code were copyrightable.348 Recall that the
343
See Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760, 766 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (upholding copyright of Texas barbeque recipes for “Armadillo Eggs,” “Cattle Baron Cheese Dollars,” and
“Gringo Gulch Grog”).
344
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “computer program”).
345
Again, assuming it meets the demands of originality and minimal creativity.
346
This is because the goal of the program is not to produce mental effects but rather to
accomplish a task in the world.
347
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
348
Id. at 1347.
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Federal Circuit asked whether Oracle made “creative” choices, where
creative seemed to mean only that they selected from the many options
that were available.349 Instead, the court should have considered the reasons why Oracle made the decisions that it did.350 Were there any aspects of the code that were intended to create particular thoughts, feelings, or emotions in human readers separate from a recognition of the
function and results of the code? Or, instead were the elements of the
code chosen solely for purposes of ease, efficiency, and functionality?
The plaintiff should be made to specify which elements were chosen to
produce mental effects. Although we need not care whether the arrangement of elements did in fact produce the intended effects in readers,351 we must determine that the arrangement of elements was intended
to produce effects.
Only if Oracle can point to specific aspects of the program that were
intended to produce mental effects separate from the program’s outcome
will it be deemed to have engaged in authorship. Having isolated these
aspects of the program, the judge should then inquire whether each one
is (1) original to Oracle or copied from another source; and (2) more
than trivially creative. In order for any element of the programs to be
copyrightable, it must meet each of these requirements. Because Oracle
was not required to specify the aspects of the program that were intended to produce mental effects, we cannot easily judge the case from the
available record. The case should be returned to the trial court for further
factfinding.
***
This Part has applied my theory of authorship to a series of important
problems in copyright jurisprudence. Under this theory, the realm of
copyrightable authorship is both broader and narrower than previously
conceived. Some kinds of creativity that have not been heretofore rec-

349
Id. at 1356; see also id. at 1361 (“The focus is . . . on the options that were available to
[the author] at the time it created the API packages.”).
350
Unfortunately the court explicitly chose not to consider one important reason why the
programmers arranged elements in the way that they did: interoperability. To the extent that
Oracle made the decisions it did in order to allow its programs to work with other programs,
this is not an authorship-relevant decision and should be excluded from copyrightability. See
Samuelson, supra note 152, at 3.
351
This relates to the programmer’s semantic intentions. See supra notes 185–91 and accompanying text.
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ognized as copyrightable authorship fall within Congress’s constitutional power. If the appropriate circumstances arise, Congress could grant
copyright to a wider class of creative works, including perfumes, tactile
works, and culinary dishes. In other respects, however, some works that
would have received protection under the unconstrained-choice approach may now appear to lack the necessary features of authorship.
Courts reviewing visual arts, methods, and computer code must inquire
more deeply into creators’ motivations and decisions than they previously have. Asking not simply whether creators made unconstrained choices, but instead analyzing why those choices were made will likely yield
a narrower range of protection in some classes of copyright works.
CONCLUSION
Who can be an “Author” and what counts as a “Writing” are fundamental issues in copyright doctrine, but they have received little systematic examination. This Article defends a theory of authorship and applies
it to a number of important copyright disputes, including the constitutional limit of powers and the scope of copyrightable authorship in particular works. This theory has broad applicability in a number of other
central intellectual property areas.
Recently, the ownership of copyright works has become a matter of
considerable dispute. For example, if an actor performs a role in a movie, can she qualify as the author of her performance?352 What about the
director of the movie?353 To what extent can the appropriation artist who
re-photographs another’s image claim authorship of the resulting picture?354 In all of these situations, the answer turns on how the law conceives of authorship.
In addition, copyright law must often determine whether a work that
combines utilitarian features with authorship should receive protection.
These “useful articles” include belt buckles,355 bicycle racks,356 and
mannequin forms.357 Courts have developed numerous tests to answer
352

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 247 (2d Cir. 2015).
Christopher Buccafusco, Appropriation Art Meets Instagram: Is Copyright Law
Ready?, MSNBC.com (May 26, 2015, 7:41 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/app
ropriation-art-meets-instagram-copyright-law-ready [https://perma.cc/SM6V-YCFW].
355
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989, 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
356
Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148–49 (2d Cir. 1987).
357
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985).
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this question, but, in so doing, they have failed to ground their approaches in a coherent theory of authorship.358 Only by understanding
what it is that authors do can we determine whether these useful articles
contain separable copyrightable features.
Finally, the approach to authorship that I take in this Article has important implications for other areas of IP, including utility patent law,
design patent law, and trademark law. In these areas, the constitutional
text also imposes restrictions on congressional power. More work is
necessary to appreciate the scope of that power. For example, to what
extent does the IP Clause impose limitations on Congress’s power to enact design protection laws?359 Does the authority to grant design patents
emerge from the references to “Authors” and “Writings” or from “Inventors” and “Discoveries”? To answer these questions the law needs
fully developed and coherent theories of authorship and inventorship.

358

See Yen, supra note 172, at 247.
For a recent discussion, see Ralph D. Clifford & Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The Constitutionality of Design Patents, 14 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 553 (2015) (discussing the constitutional authority for design patents).
359

